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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE COST OF CLEANING UP THE ENVIRONMENT 
Defense contractors are incurring costs to remediate 
environmental contamination that occurred as a result of 
working on both defense and non-defense contracts. The actual 
work that generated the contamination has often been completed 
for years.  Any defense contracts that might have been 
associated with the contamination are closed out and filed 
away in some dusty alcove years ago. Consequently, today's 
remediation costs for yesterday's contamination cannot be 
assigned to current contracts on the basis of a direct causal 
or beneficial relationship. The cause of the contamination was 
work that is done. The contract that benefited by being able 
to dispose of contaminants in a less costly fashion than would 
have been the case today is complete. Yet, if the contractor 
is to recover the remediation costs, the only method for 
recovery is allocation to current business, which includes 
defense contracts. A fair and equitable method is required to 
allocate remediation costs to contracts that did not cause or 
benefit from the contaminating activity. 
The issue of how environmental remediation costs should 
be allocated is more than a technical question for 
accountants. Approximately $135 billion is spent each year on 
environmental compliance and cleanup [Ref. 1, p. 11]• 
Similarly, a Harvard Business Review article cites a 1991 
survey of several hundred top managers who expect 
environmental costs to double as a percentage of sales over 
the next decade [Ref. 2, p. 46]. The same article states that 
total annualized environmental costs will grow from .8% of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 2.3% of GDP over the next 
decade. 
Defense contractors' environmental costs are also rising. 
The GAO states that ten defense contractors, who were surveyed 
for a 1992 report, had incurred a cumulative $300 million for 
investigation and initial cleanup costs [Ref. 3, p. 2]. Based 
on partial projections the same companies expect future 
cleanup costs to reach $1.1 billion. The Congressional Budget 
Office reports that potential cost growth of environmental 
cleanup efforts is one of the key weaknesses in the Clinton 
Administration Defense Plan; they believe that additional 
costs for base and facilities cleanup could exceed $4 billion 
per year over the next five years [Ref. 4, p. 16] . 
There is little doubt that the relative importance of 
environmental remediation costs in proportion to other costs 
will increase. The significant question relative to these 
rising environmental costs is, "Who will pay?" This question 
assumes even greater importance as Government's and industry's 
ability to pay is diminished. 
Normally, contractor costs are recovered when the 
customer pays for the goods or services rendered at the price 
agreed upon in the contract. The Government, however, imposes 
restrictions on what costs may be used as a basis for 
negotiating contract price or will be reimbursed in certain 
types of contracts. Before a cost is considered allowable, it 
must be allocable. Allocability either requires a minimal 
causal or beneficial relationship between the cost objectives 
and the cost incurred or an assumption that the costs are 
necessary for overall operation of the business. Given the 
tenuous relationship between the remediation costs incurred to 
cleanup old contamination and current contracts, it is no 
wonder that the allocation issue is fraught with uncertainty. 
The uncertainty is compounded as remediation costs continue to 
rise. 
Ultimately, how environmental remediation costs are 
allocated or are not allocated to defense contracts will 
substantially determine who will bear the costs of cleaning up 
the environment at contractor facilities. 
B.  AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the allocation of environmental 
remediation costs, which were incurred by contractors to 
cleanup prior contamination, to current Department of Defense 
contracts. 
1. Primary Question 
The primary question this thesis attempts to answer is: 
What are feasible methods for allocating environmental 
remediation costs to Department of Defense contracts in a fair 
and equitable manner? 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
To answer the primary question addressed above, the 
following subsidiary questions are addressed: 
1. What is the current guidance for the allocation 
of environmental remediation costs? 
2. What other methods were considered while the 
current guidance was being developed? 
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of 
each allocation method? 
4. What allocation methods are actually being used 
by defense contractors and allowed by Contracting 
Officers? 
5. Is additional guidance regarding the 
allocation of environmental remediation costs 
required by contracting officers? 
Co  SCOPE 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the allocation of 
environmental remediation costs. Compliance costs are not 
addressed. 
Environmental costs generally include two broad types of 
costs, compliance and remediation [Ref. 5, p. 2]. Compliance 
costs are incurred to comply with Federal, state or local laws 
and regulations. Compliance costs are incurred in the current 
period and are either expensed immediately or capitalized and 
amortized over future periods. Irrespective of the mechanics 
of how the actual costs are treated, they are recognized as 
benefitting current and future business. There is little 
dissention that otherwise allowable compliance costs should be 
allocated to current contracts in accordance with contractors' 
approved cost accounting systems. 
In direct contrast, remediation costs, interchangeably 
referred to as cleanup costs, are incurred in the present 
period to clean up contamination that resulted from earlier 
work [Ref. 5, p. 1] . Some of the work may have been for 
commercial contracts. Some portion may have been for 
Department of Defense (DOD) contracts. Any associated 
contracts were likely closed out long before the current 
period. There is, consequently, no direct causal and 
beneficial relationship between the costs incurred and current 
contracts that can be used as a vehicle to allocate the 
remediation costs. This lack of direct relationship between 
costs incurred and current contracts complicates the issue of 
how such remediation costs should be allocated, if at all. 
Given the lack of a clear causal and beneficial 
relationship between the incurred remediation costs and a 
current cost objective, a number of different allocation 
methods have been developed and used by contracting officers. 
A GAO report, has commented on this variable treatment of 
environmental cleanup costs, including cost allocation, by 
contract administrators [Ref. 6, p. lj . This variability also 
provides the primary impetus to this thesis and resulted in 
the inclusion of the following material: 
1. A review of cost accounting principles relevant 
to the allocation of environmental remediation 
costs. 
2. A review and discussion of current DOD guidance 
regarding the allocation of contractor cleanup 
costs to DOD contracts. 
3. An investigation and explanation of allocation 
methods being used by contracting officers based on 
research, informal surveys and interviews. 
4. An evaluation of the various allocation methods 
including a discussion of the amount of information 
needed to implement each method, affects on 
overhead rates, repercussions to a declining DOD 
budget and consequences to a contractor attempting 
to enter a commercial marketplace. 
5. An investigation of whether or not additional 
guidance regarding the allocation of remediation 
costs is required by DOD contracting officers. 
D.  METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses a variety of references to gain 
historical and current information regarding the allocation of 
remediation costs to DOD contracts. This section briefly 
describes those methods. 
An initial survey of the Defense Logistics Studies 
Information Exchange (DLSIE) and the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC) resulted in the generation of 
extensive bibliographies. From the bibliographies, specific 
references were selected to provide the necessary background 
information. Additionally, a thorough search was conducted on 
the INTERNET at a number of GOPHER servers and World Wide Web 
dedicated to environmental topics. 
The next step was to determine current environmental cost 
guidance and begin identifying allocation methods actually 
being used. Phone interviews were conducted with personnel in 
policy positions at the following organizations: Defense 
Contract Management Command (DCMC), Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA), Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and 
the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB). Following the 
first set of interviews, more detailed operational information 
was obtained by phone interviews with field personnel in DCMC 
and the DCAA. Specifically, each of the Corporate 
Administrative Contracting Officers (CACO) associated with 
DCMC's Environmental Initiatives Task Force Pilot Cost 
Allowance Program (Pilot Program) was interviewed. 
Additionally, personnel at the Aerospace Industries 
Association (AIA) and Price-Waterhouse, an accounting firm 
that deals with Government contract issues, were interviewed. 
Following the interviews, an informal survey was used to 
gather information about actual cost allocation methods from 
50 DCMC activities: Defense Plant Representative Offices 
(DPRO) and Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO) 
offices. The survey presented a hypothetical situation 
involving environmental remediation costs followed by five 
possible allocation methods, which were based on the previous 
interviews. The survey respondents were requested to select 
the best allocation method for three scenarios. Finally, the 
respondents were asked whether or not they believed that an 
environmental Cost Principle is needed. 
Throughout this study, it is assumed that the reader is 
familiar with Federal  contracting  concepts,  basic  cost 
accounting, Cost Principles and the Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS) . 
E.  BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will primarily benefit those who develop 
contract accounting policies for environmental remediation 
costs and those who implement them. Given the growing 
importance of such costs, it has the potential to benefit a 
growing population of vitally concerned contracting personnel. 
Benefitting organizations include both DCMC and the major 
procuring systems commands within DOD in addition to other 
agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE) or the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) where 
environmental costs are also an urgent concern. 
This thesis is a systematic analysis of how cleanup costs 
could be allocated and the associated consequence of each 
method. Coupled with the information obtained from the 
informal survey, it provides the basis for a conceptual 
framework that may be used to apply the different methods when 
warranted by differing circumstances. 
F.  ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
This section describes the organization and format of the 
thesis. 
Chapter II is a summary of cost accounting theory and 
practices as they apply to the allocation of costs to 
Government contracts. This material serves as the foundation 
for the discussion of the various cost allocation methods 
discussed later in the thesis. 
In Chapter III, the development of current DOD guidance 
regarding the allocation of remediation costs is discussed. 
This chapter serves as the starting point for the discussion 
of the alternative methods encountered during the interviews 
and as a result of the informal survey. 
Chapter IV is a discussion of the alternate cleanup cost 
allocation methods. It describes the actual mechanisms of each 
method and associated issues. 
In Chapter V, the results of the informal survey are 
presented and discussed. 
Chapter VI is an analysis and evaluation of the 
allocation methods. It includes a discussion of the amount of 
information needed to implement each method, affects on 
overhead rates, repercussions to a declining DOD budget and 
consequences to a contractor attempting to enter a commercial 
marketplace. 
Chapter VII consists of independent conclusions drawn 
from the researcher's analysis. In particular, the current 
policy of continuing to allocate remediation costs to indirect 
cost pools is questioned. The research questions are answered 
and a number of specific recommendations regarding the 
treatment of environmental remediation costs are presented. 
II.  THE ALLOCATION OF INDIRECT COSTS 
In this chapter, those elements of cost accounting theory 
pertinent to the allocation of indirect costs are reviewed 
with particular emphasis on what constitutes a fair or 
equitable allocation. Next, the allocation of indirect costs 
to Government contracts is examined. Finally, a number of the 
problems associated with indirect cost allocations are 
highlighted. The material in this chapter serves as a 
foundation for the discussion of the various methods used to 
allocate environmental remediation costs. 
A.  COST ALLOCATION 
Data about the resources expended by an organization to 
achieve its goals are gathered in a cost accounting system. 
The costs are measured, allotted to accounting periods and 
assigned to cost objectives [Ref. 7, p. 412] . Cost objectives, 
in turn, are physical or organizational entities about which 
cost related information is needed: a product line, 
department, process, or, in the case of Government 
contracting, a contract. When a cost can be feasibly linked to 
a single cost objective, the cost is directly assigned. When 
the cost is not uniquely attributable to a single cost 
objective, the cost is accumulated in an indirect cost pool 
for subsequent allocation across an appropriate base. This 
chapter deals with the allocation of such indirect costs 
because most environmental cleanup costs incurred today by 
Government contractors cannot be directly linked with a single 
contract. 
1.  Reasons for Allocating Costs 
Indirect costs are allocated to cost objectives for a 
number of reasons. Managers allocate costs to estimate the 
consequences of decisions. Costs may be allocated in a certain 
manner to elicit desired behaviors from managers and to 
evaluate their performance. Costs may also be allocated to 
provide guidance for product pricing. [Ref. 8, p. 3; Ref. 9, 
p. 17; and Ref. 10, p. 8] 
In addition to self-imposed reasons for cost allocations, 
there are a number of externally imposed requirements. A 
company must periodically prepare financial statements for 
external reporting; asset values and operating expenses must 
be determined. Regulated utilities must allocate costs to 
ensure that cost recovery does not adversely affect social 
welfare. Finally, companies that deal with Government 
contracts may be required to allocate costs to provide a basis 
for cost reimbursement or for price negotiations. [Ref. 9, p. 
22] 
When establishing a cost allocation method, the objective 
of the allocation will determine how two major issues are 
addressed. First, the number and type of cost pools that 
should be used to accumulate the indirect costs must be 
determined. Secondly, the base over which the costs should be 
allocated to the cost objective must be designated. If the 
cost accounting system is intended only to provide a few 
external financial statements, the number of cost pools may be 
limited and the allocation base may be chosen more for 
convenience or simplicity over other factors. Conversely, a 
firm that requires detailed cost information to implement a 
fiercely competitive pricing strategy may establish multiple 
cost pools and attempt to establish allocation bases that 
reflect a relationship between the costs incurred and the cost 
objectives. [Ref. 8, p. 12] 
For the purpose of this thesis, the primary objective of 
cost allocation is to provide a basis for cost reimbursement 
and the negotiation of contract price in Government 
contracting. In the next section, criteria that should be 
considered when selecting an allocation method for this 
objective are discussed. 
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B.  COST ALLOCATION CRITERIA 
Given the objective of a cost allocation, a number of 
criteria should be considered when determining an actual 
allocation method. Although a contractor working on Government 
contracts must use an allocation method that complies with the 
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), if CAS applies, and Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), many of these same 
criteria are implicit in the CAS and GAAP. In particular, the 
requirement for a fair or equitable allocation permeates all 
discussions of cost allocation in Government contracting. 
[Ref. 8, p. 12 and Ref. 9, p. 41] 
Key to the concept of fairness or equity is the idea of 
"Having the qualities of impartiality and honesty... 
Evenhanded; equal as between conflicting interests." [Ref. 11, 
pp. 632 and 713] The desire for evenhanded and impartial cost 
accounting methods is manifested in an appeal for uniformity, 
consistency, and verifiability [Ref. 7, p. 412]. Each of the 
criteria discussed below is an attempt to establish an 
allocation rule that can be applied in different circumstances 
to allocate costs in a consistent and uniform fashion without 
prejudice to either party, fairly and equitably. 
1.  Benefit 
Benefit has been proposed as a criterion to guide cost 
allocations because of the implications of fairness [Ref. 9, 
p. 41]. This criterion rests on the assumption that indirect 
costs should be allocated to the extent that they benefit the 
cost objective. An allocation base is selected that apportions 
the costs to the extent of the beneficial relationship. The 
cost pools are constructed to include only those cost elements 
that benefit the cost objective in the specified manner. Other 
costs will be excluded. For example: the cost of utilities may 
be accumulated in a factory facilities overhead pool and 
allocated to cost objectives on the basis of square footage. 
11 
Although the cost of a factory supervisor's salary also 
benefits the cost objective, it will be accumulated in another 
pool because square footage does not adequately reflect the 
nature of the beneficial relationship. 
The establishment of a cost allocation method on the 
basis of benefit depends upon the exercise of human judgment. 
A number of assumptions must be made regarding the underlying 
nature of the beneficial relationship: these assumptions will 
vary from situation to situation. Additionally, as one author 
points out, benefit, as an operational criterion, "...becomes 
increasingly difficult to apply as the services become more 
remote from the cost objectives." [Ref. 8, p. 13] It may be 
simple to obtain agreement on the method to allocate the 
utility costs in the above example, but the issue of 
allocating a remote corporate headquarter's staff costs on a 
beneficial basis is more difficult. 
2 o  Cause 
This criterion rests on the premise that costs should be 
allocated to cost objectives on the basis of the factors that 
caused the costs to be incurred [Ref. 8, p. 13]. For example, 
by assuming that the need for repairs is caused by machine 
usage, repair costs could be accumulated in an indirect cost 
pool and allocated on the basis of machine-hours used per cost 
objective. Cause, like benefit, has been a traditional 
criterion for cost allocation because its apparent consistency 
and verifiability convey implications of fairness [Ref. 9, p. 
43]. Note, however, that like benefit, cause as a criterion 
becomes more difficult to apply as the cost objective becomes 
more remote from the cost. 
3.  Neutrality 
To ensure that an allocation method does not generate 
misleading information that results in inappropriate 
decisions, cost allocations should be made in such a way that 
their affect on decision making is neutral. The criterion of 
12 
neutrality is often a constraint when a cost allocation method 
used for one objective is applied to another. [Ref. 8] 
For example, assume that a simple cost allocation method 
has been developed to provide external financial reports. In 
this example, supervisorial salaries, among other costs, are 
accumulated in an indirect cost pool and allocated to cost 
objectives on the basis of machine-hour usage. If the same 
cost accounting system were then used to make decisions about 
pricing or resource use, the decision would be erroneously 
biased towards a less capital intensive alternative. The 
allocation base results in capital intensive cost objectives 
attracting a disproportionate share of the overhead; a poor 
decision could be the result. 
Neutrality as a criterion becomes relevant to Government 
contracting when a cost allocation method distorts the cost of 
a contract or program relative to others. Program managers and 
others exercising program oversight could arrive at erroneous 
conclusions if the cost allocation method is not neutral. 
4. Independence of Cost Objectives 
Concern for independence of cost objectives grows from a 
desire to ensure that costs resulting from the actions of one 
cost objective do not affect the costs allocated to another 
[Ref. 9, p. 15] . For example, assume that a centrally provided 
service represents a substantial fixed cost that is allocated 
across a measure of each department's usage. If one department 
decides to obtain the service elsewhere, the remaining 
departments will be allocated a greater amount in spite of no 
action on their part. 
5. Ability to Bear 
Ability to bear is a last resort method used to allocate 
costs when nothing better can be found [Ref. 8, p. 15] . Absent 
a more obvious causal or beneficial relationship and given a 
need to fully allocate costs, costs are allocated in 
proportion to the cost objective's relative size. For example, 
13 
costs may be allocated across a base made up of sales revenue 
or total cost input. 
6.  Fairness or Equity 
Fairness or equity are often cited as criteria to be 
considered when allocating costs in Government contracting 
[Ref. 8, p. 12 and Ref 9, p. 41]. As already discussed, the 
benefit and cause criteria convey connotations of fairness. 
The ability to bear also implies fairness as a criterion; if 
no better method can be found, that which is best able to bear 
the costs, bears the most. It is at least consistent, uniform 
and verifiable. Neutrality and independence of cost objectives 
also connote fairness or equity in the sense that the 
allocation method should be impartial and free of favoritism. 
A number of efforts have been made to quantify the 
concept of fairness or equity as a means of choosing between 
cost allocation methods. 
a. The Impersonality Criterion 
This criterion proposes that method A is more fair 
than method B if the expected value of method A to a cost 
objective for which an allocation method has not been 
determined is greater than the expected value of B [Ref. 12, 
p. 86] -1 For example, assume that the cost allocations in 
Table 1 could be made to similar cost objectives in companies 
one through three under alternative methods A through E. 
A notional fourth company, examining the data, would 
attempt to calculate the costs that might be allocated under 
Methods A through E. Given equal probabilities, the expected 
cost allocation under Method B would be $345; under Method E 
it would be $430. Since the lowest cost allocation translates 
1
 The discussion in the reference concerns a corporate 
division as the specific cost objective. For the purpose of 
the thesis, this has been adapted for a more generic 
discussion. This comment also applies to the discussion of the 
Minimax Criterion and the Grading Principle. 
14 
to the highest expected value, Method A at $323 would be 
considered the most fair per this criterion. 
Meth A Meth B Meth C Meth D Meth E 
#1 Co. $350 $400 $250 $380 $500 
#2 Co. $230 $420 $540 $320 $510 
#3 Co. $390 $215 $615 $370 $280 
Exp. 
Values 
$323 $345 $468 $357 $430 
Table 1. Expected Value of Allocation Methods A through E 
i». Minimax Criterion 
This criterion involves maximizing the minimum 
benefit obtained by any one cost objective [Ref. 12, p. 87]. 
This approach is essentially a "minimax" criterion where the 
maximum allocation to any given cost objective is minimized. 
In the example used above, Method D would be considered the 
most fair since $380 is the lowest maximum. 
c.     The Grading Principles 
The grading principle assumes that allocation method 
A is more fair than method B if either of the following two 
conditions are met: 
1. Every cost objective prefers its allocation 
under Method A over its allocation under Method B. 
2. Every cost objective prefers its allocation 
under Method A over that obtained by any other cost 
objective under Method B. [Ref. 12, p. 85] 
A higher preference for a method is associated with 
a lower allocated cost. In the example used above, Method B 
is more fair than Method E because a lower allocation results 
15 
for each cost objective when Method B is applied. Note that 
Method A is not more fair than Method B per the Suppes' 
Grading Principles since cost objective three will be 
allocated a higher cost. 
The criteria discussed attempt to add quantitative 
indicators of fairness or equity to evaluate cost allocation 
methods. For any of the three criterion to result in the 
selection of a more fair allocation method, however, the 
individual methods themselves must be fair or equitable. The 
quantitative criterion are a means to evaluate competing 
methods for fairness or equity. If the methods themselves are 
not fair in the sense that they are not consistent, uniform 
and verifiable, then the three quantitative criteria are 
useless. 
Although the application of the three criteria to the 
example resulted in three disparate results, they are 
additional tools with which to appraise a given cost 
allocation method and provide insights into its consequence. 
In the next section, the allocation of indirect costs to 
Government contracts is discussed. 
C.  THE ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 
Cost allocation guidance for defense contractors is 
delineated in Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) for those 
contractors who are CAS covered. Allocation as a prerequisite 
for cost allowability is discussed in the FAR at Part 31. 
Following a discussion of the FAR provisions, CAS 418, 
Allocation of Direct and Indirect Costs; CAS 403, Allocation 
of Home Office Expenses to Segments; and CAS 410, Allocation 
of Business Unit General and Administrative Expenses to Final 
Cost Objectives, are examined. 
As the requirements are discussed, it is important for 
the reader to be reminded that the FAR and CAS are not 
imposing a specific cost accounting system on contractors. 
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Rather, the intent is to achieve a fair and equitable 
allocation; one that is consistent, uniform and verifiable. 
[Ref. 7, p. 413] 
1.  Cost Allocation in the FAR 
The FAR defines a direct cost as one that can be 
specifically identified or traced to a contract. Direct costs 
are nearly always directly charged. The only exception is when 
insignificant amounts, which if treated as indirect costs, do 
not materially affect the result. An indirect cost is then 
defined as those remaining costs that cannot be directly 
identified to a single, final cost objective. This includes 
costs that are identifiable to multiple final cost objectives 
or an intermediate cost objective. [Ref. 13] 
Indirect costs are accumulated in indirect pools. The 
groupings are determined so that a common bases can be 
selected that allocates the costs "...on the basis of the 
benefits accruing to the several cost objectives." [Ref. 13] 
The number of indirect cost pools and the allocation base are 
determined by the contractor provided that they meet this 
general guidance. Additionally, the FAR permits a contractor 
to further simplify the allocation method if it can be shown 
that fewer pools and bases result in essentially the same 
outcome. [Ref. 13] 
For a cost to be allowable, as when determining total 
contract cost for cost reimbursement contracts or for price 
negotiations, a number of factors must be considered. 
Allocability is one those factors.2 For a cost to be 
allowable, it must be allocable. 
A cost is considered to be allocable if it is assignable 
to one or more cost objectives on the basis of relative 
2
 The other factors that must be considered include 
reasonableness, CAS (if applicable), Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), the FAR Cost Principles and 
terms of the contract itself. 
17 
benefit received or some other equitable relationship [Ref. 
13]. Three specific standards are delineated: 
First, a cost is considered to be allocable if it is 
specifically incurred for a contract. A direct cost is 
directly assigned to a contract provided that it is otherwise 
allowable (i.e. reasonable, per CAS or GAAP, not excluded by 
the contract or not specifically unallowable in the Cost 
Principles). [Ref. 13] 
Second, a cost is also considered to be allocable if it 
benefits more than one cost objective and can be distributed 
to all of them in proportion to the benefit received [Ref. 
13]. This permits the contractor to allocate otherwise 
allowable indirect costs to multiple objectives across an 
appropriate and mutually beneficial base. 
The last standard departs from the others' use of benefit 
as the underlying allocation criterion and is actually based 
on the ability to bear. An otherwise allowable cost is 
considered to be allocable if it is required for the overall 
operation of the business. It is not necessary to establish a 
direct relationship to any particular cost objective. Such 
costs are generally allocated across a base that represents 
the aggregate of the contractor's business, such as total 
sales or total cost input. [Ref. 13] 
Three of the CAS standards that are relevant to the 
discussion of how environmental remediation costs are 
allocated are discussed next. 
2.  Cost Accounting Standard 418s The Allocation of 
Direct and Indirect Costs 
CAS 418 amplifies the FAR guidance regarding the 
allocation of indirect costs. It is more specific with regard 
to the two key issues that must be addressed when determining 
any cost allocation method: the nature of the cost pools and 
the allocation base. CAS 418 specifies, for example, that 
indirect costs should be accumulated in homogeneous cost 
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pools. The requirement for homogeneity, in turn, is satisfied 
if: "(1) the major activities in the pool have similar 
beneficial/causal relationships to cost objectives; or (2) 
separate allocations of costs of dissimilar activities would 
not result in substantially different amounts." [Ref. 14] Note 
that in addition to using the criterion of benefit, CAS 418 
also mentions cause as a criterion. Cause is not mentioned in 
the FAR Cost Principle. 
CAS 418 is also more precise than the FAR about the 
allocation base that should be used to allocate indirect 
costs. A cost pool that contains significant amounts of direct 
labor or direct material should be allocated over a base 
"...representative of the activity being managed." [Ref. 14] 
CAS 418 goes on to require that if the costs in the pool are 
primarily related to materials management, the allocation base 
should be direct materials. If the pool consists of facilities 
related costs, machine hours is proposed as being a more 
representative allocation base. In the event that neither 
material nor facilities costs predominate, labor hours or 
dollars should be used as an allocation base. These 
requirements are intended to ensure that overhead allocations 
are not distributed by an inappropriate base. [Ref. 14] 
Indirect costs are allocated per CAS 418 if there is a 
beneficial or causal relationship to the cost objective. In 
the event that such a relationship is not present, but the 
cost is necessary for the overall operation of the company, it 
may be allocated by CAS 403 to a business unit, if applicable, 
and CAS 410 to the final cost objectives. 
3.  CAS 403: The Allocation of Home Office Expenses to 
Segments 
CAS 403 covers the allocation of home office expenses to 
business units under its control. The expenses include costs 
incurred and accumulated at the home office for the benefit of 
multiple units. 
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There are essentially three categories of home office 
expenses. The first is costs that are incurred for a specific 
business unit and are allocated to that unit. [Ref. 15] 
Costs, such as centralized services, that are incurred 
for a number of business units and whose relationship can be 
defined by an unbiased measure are grouped together in 
homogeneous pools. The costs are then allocated to the 
business units "...on the most objective basis available." 
[Ref 15] For example, the cost for a central payments function 
might be accumulated in a single pool and allocated to the 
various business units on the basis of the number of invoices 
processed. 
The first two categories of cost are allocated in 
accordance with CAS 403 on the basis of benefit or cause. The 
last category is based on an ability to bear criterion. 
Costs that cannot be identified to a specific business 
unit, but were incurred for overall management of the company 
are termed residual expenses [Ref. 15] . Such residual expenses 
are allocated on the basis of a formula which uses payroll, 
operating revenue and the net book value of tangible capital 
to create a base that is a measure of the unit's business 
activity [Ref. 15]. The larger business units, consequently, 
are allocated the larger share of the residual costs. 
CAS 403 permits a special allocation of home office 
expenses to particular segments in the event that their 
benefit from the expense pool differs significantly from the 
benefits accruing to other segments [Ref. 15]. 
4.  CAS 410s Allocation of Business Unit General and 
Administrative Expenses to Final Cost Objectives 
General and Administrative (G&A) expenses are residual 
costs in the sense that they are left over after all other 
costs, whether direct or indirect, have been allocated on a 
causal or beneficial basis. G&A includes expenses that are 
incurred for the general management and administration of the 
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business unit as a whole and have no directly measurable 
relationship to a cost objective. Also, home office expenses 
that were allocated to the business unit per CAS 403 are 
accumulated in the G&A cost pool. [Ref. 7] 
CAS 410 specifies that one of the following allocation 
bases will be used: total cost input, value added cost input 
or a single cost element input, whichever is the most 
appropriate [Ref. 16]. Total cost input is the total cost of 
production. For example: total cost input might include direct 
labor, direct material engineering overhead and factory 
overhead. Value added cost input is the total cost of 
production less material and subcontract costs. A single- 
element cost inputs include direct labor hours or dollars. 
The base that most accurately reflects the total activity 
of the business unit would be selected. [Ref. 16] For example, 
since a value added cost input base excludes subcontract 
costs, contracts with little subcontracted activity would be 
allocated a disproportionate share of the G&A pool. 
CAS 410 also permits a special allocation of expenses 
that would normally be considered G&A to a cost objective. 
This is permitted when the benefits accruing to the contract 
from the GSA expense are significantly different than those 
accruing to other cost objectives. [Ref. 16] 
CAS 410 is a mechanism by which costs that are necessary 
for the overall operation of the business unit, but are not 
related in a beneficial or causal way, can be allocated 
equitably to the various cost objectives. Each of the cost 
input bases defined in CAS 410 results in G&A being allocated 
on the basis of an ability to bear. Contracts with greater 
production costs, for example, will attract more G&A. 
CAS, incorporated in the FAR as Appendix B, offer 
detailed allocation guidance in the interest of uniformity and 
verifiability. Based on the criteria of benefit, cause and 
ability to bear, they seek to institute a fair or equitable 
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allocation of costs. 
In the next section, a number of issues surrounding the 
allocation of costs are highlighted. 
D.  COST ALLOCATION ISSUES 
In this section a number of issues affecting the 
allocation of indirect costs as they pertain to remediation 
costs are examined. 
1.  The Arbitrary Nature of Cost Allocation Methods 
Much of the literature on cost allocation is concerned 
with either proving or disputing that indirect cost 
allocations are arbitrary and should be avoided [Ref. 8, p. 9; 
Ref. 9, p. 9; and Ref. 10, p. 1]. One author summarizing the 
arguments against allocations writes: 
...cost allocations are arbitrary because they are 
necessarily made on the basis of someone's judgment 
as to how they should be made and not on the basis 
of some logical analysis of the scientific 
evidence. They are incorrigible... because they can 
be neither proved correct nor rejected as 
incorrect. [Ref 8, p. 10] 
Primarily based on economic arguments, this assertion 
refutes the need for allocations to make resource decisions. 
Many contend that cost allocations, being arbitrary in nature, 
will actually result in managers making suboptimal decisions. 
[Ref. 9, p. 22] 
There are, however, other reasons for allocating costs. 
In the case of Government contracting, allowable costs are 
fully allocated to contracts to permit cost reimbursement and 
price negotiation as an element of public policy, to establish 
a fair and reasonable price. Given this objective for the cost 
allocation, the methods developed to implement the public 
policy should be consistent, uniform and verifiable. One 
author has pointed out that "...fairness is pursued with the 
understanding that adding the objective to cost allocation 
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considerations can cause welfare losses in the system." [Ref 
9, p. 23] The same author urges explicit recognition of the 
fact that when political, administrative or behavioral factors 
operate to determine allocations in a regulatory setting, the 
resultant method "...will not likely reflect economic issues." 
[Ref. 7, p. 31] 
The cost allocation methods delineated in the FAR and the 
CAS were developed to institute the socioeconomic policy of 
fairness and equity in Government contracting. If the same 
cost allocation methods are used to implement another 
dissimilar public policy goal, such as environmental cleanup, 
conflict could result. 
2.  Cost and Benefit 
Benefit and cause appear to be mirror images of a single 
relationship between a cost and a cost objective [Ref. 8] . The 
cost objective causes the costs; the cost objective benefits 
from the costs incurred. This reciprocal relationship, 
however, has not always been universally accepted as the 
following case will exemplify. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation paid property taxes on 
commercial inventories and, although Government inventories 
were exempt from the taxes, allocated them to all contracts, 
commercial and Government alike. The Government argued that 
since the Government contracts did not cause the taxes, they 
should be allocated only to commercial contracts. Lockheed 
responded by claiming that the "...tax funded public services 
were provided uniformly to the corporation and to its 
employees and, thus, that all work benefited proportionately 
from those public services and the tax paid to support them." 
[Ref. 8, p. 14] In this case, the Court of Claims accepted 
Lockheed's argument. [Ref. 8, p. 14] 
Cause and benefit are not interchangeable terms. In the 
case of environmental remediation costs it will be seen that 
current   contracts,   while   not   causing   yesterday's 
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contamination, may benefit from the cleanup in the same sense 
that Lockheed's contracts benefited from tax funded public 
services. 
3.  Input Substitution 
William P. Rogerson [Ref. 18, p. 692] explains how two 
features of Government contracting may provide incentives for 
contractors to engage in inefficient input substitution. Input 
substitution involves replacing one input, such as capital, 
with another, such as direct labor. 
First, many large dollar value defense contracts are 
negotiated procurements. The contract prices are cost based, 
either directly as in a cost-reimbursable contract or 
indirectly as in the case of a fixed-price arrangement that 
uses negotiated overhead rates. For a dollar increase in 
allowable costs, contract price often rises proportionately. 
The actual amount will depend upon the fee or profit structure 
of the contract and the competition in the procurement: more 
competitors seeking the same contract will likely reduce the 
contract price's sensitivity to cost increases. In contrast, 
the price of commercial items made by the same company will be 
determined competitively. A dollar increase in costs may have 
no bearing on market price in a competitive market. [Ref. 18, 
p. 672] 
Secondly, a significant portion of contractor costs are 
not directly assigned to contracts; rather, they are 
accumulated in indirect cost pools for subsequent allocation. 
Many of the indirect costs are allocated across a direct labor 
base or a base containing direct labor as an element. 
Due to the first feature, a contractor would like to 
assign more of its costs to the well-funded, Government 
procurements, particularly sole source, where a dollar 
increase in cost will most likely result in near equal 
increase in price. The second feature, the magnitude of costs 
indirectly allocated, provides the mechanism. A contractor can 
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increase the amount of overhead allocated to a contract by 
increasing the amount of direct labor used. As a result, a 
contractor has an incentive to substitute direct labor for 
other inputs on contracts when the price is sensitive to cost 
increases. [Ref. 18, p. 677] 
Rogerson [Ref. 18, p. 677] addresses the two following 
input substitutions: direct labor for capital and direct labor 
for material. In the first case, there is an incentive to 
undercapitalize Government contracts that are cost sensitive 
and to overcapitalize products that are exposed to 
competition. Rogerson [Ref. 18, p. 686] cites evidence that 
defense production is undercapitalized as proof of this 
assertion. 
In the second case, there is an incentive to retain 
production in-house to increase direct labor rather than to 
subcontract for non-competitive Government contracts. The use 
of in-house labor results in additional overhead being shifted 
to the Government contracts. To substantiate this point, he 
argues that, "A considerable amount of the DOD's cost- 
monitoring activity is devoted to reviewing the adequacy of 
firms' make-or-buy decisions." [Ref. 18, p. 688] 
The incentive effect does not require the contractor to 
engage in untruthful or illegal activities. The contractor 
spends all that is charged as costs. The additional profit 
results because these costs are shifted to contracts where 
price will change proportionately with costs. [Ref. 18, p. 
672] 
Rogerson [Ref. 18, p. 688] believes that as long as the 
two features creating the incentive to substitute inputs 
exists, contractors will engage in behaviors that result in 
overhead being shifted to Government contracts. He urges more 
Government efforts to directly assign costs to eliminate the 
incentives. As an alternative to directly assigning more 
contract costs, Rogerson suggests that the Government should 
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negotiate payments for joint costs, such as G&A, on a firm- 
wide basis. [Ref. 18, p. 688] 
Accepting that current cost allocation methods result in 
incentives to substitute inputs, the addition of a sizeable 
cost element to indirect cost pools, such as environmental 
remediation costs, would amplify the effect. 
In this chapter, elements of cost accounting theory 
relevant to the allocation problem were reviewed. Next, the 
allocation of indirect costs to Government contracts was 
discussed. Finally, a number of issues related to cost 
allocation with the potential to effect the allocation of 
remediation costs were highlighted. 
In the next chapter, specific Department of Defense 
guidance on the allocation of environmental remediation costs 
are examined. 
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III.  ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COST GUIDANCE 
This chapter examines the development of current Department of 
Defense guidance regarding the allocation of environmental 
remediation costs. 
A.  DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL COST PRINCIPLE 
The late 1980s saw a general increase in the visibility 
of environmental remediation costs as an issue among contract 
administrators and resulted in requests from the field for 
guidance [Ref. 19]. In particular, the Air Force requested the 
development of a cost principle to guide contracting officers 
on claims for reimbursement of cleanup costs [Ref. 6, p. 2] . 
A working group was formed to develop a cost principle for 
eventual inclusion in the FAR [Ref. 19]; a first draft was 
completed in 1989 [Ref. 6, p. 7]. 
Controversy over the proposed cost principle resulted in 
a number of differing drafts that reflected contrasting 
approaches. Two major issues precluded agreement. The first 
dealt with the fundamental question of when, if ever, 
environmental costs should be allowed. On one extreme, draft 
proposals limited allowability of environmental costs, 
including compliance and remediation, to those incurred at 
Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) facilities. 
Conversely, other drafts incorporated the allowability of all 
environmental costs provided that there was no indication of 
contractor wrongdoing. [Ref. 6, p. 7] 
The second issue precluding agreement was dissension over 
the basic requirement for a cost principle. Issuance of a 
draft in 199 0 was delayed when the Navy and Army argued that 
there was no need for an environmental cost principle. The two 
Services maintained that the general criteria for cost 
allowability set forth in the FAR at 31-201.1, reasonableness, 
allocability and not otherwise unallowable, were adequate. 
[Ref. 20] 
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in December 1991, a draft of an environmental cost 
principle was completed by the working group and cleared by 
the Defense Acquisition Regulatory (DAR) Council. While the 
draft was being considered in the Civilian Agency Acquisition 
Council (CAAC), a copy was printed in the Federal Contracts 
Report [Ref. 20]. The resulting fire storm [Ref. 19] and a 
moratorium on Federal regulations announced by President Bush 
in his February 1992 State of the Union address precluded 
further action [Ref. 6, p. 7]. Consequently, the draft 
principle was never formally proposed or published m the 
Federal Register [Ref. 21]. 
The December 1991 draft distinguished between compliance 
and cleanup costs. Compliance costs would have been allowable 
except when they resulted from contractor wrongdoing involving 
violation of law, regulation or a compliance agreement [Ref. 
20] Costs incurred by the contractor to correct or cleanup 
damage caused by its own action or inaction, however, would 
have been generally ^allowable except when the contractor was 
able to demonstrate that four additional conditions were 
satisfied [Ref. 20] : 
1 Performance of a Government contract must have 
contributed to the environmental damage being remediated. 
2 When the damage was created, the contractor was 
conducting business in compliance with then-existing 
regulations, laws, permits and agreements. 
3. The contractor reacted promptly to minimize the damage 
and the costs of cleanup. 
4 The contractor exhausted or actively Pursued all 
available sources, such as insurance or third parties, to 
defray the costs. 
The same conditions for allowability applied even if a 
prior owner of the property had caused the environmental 
damage and the current owner was required to remediate it 
[Ref. 20]. For example, if the prior owner had contaminated 
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the property and had violated discharge permits or had not 
performed Government contracts, the cleanup costs would be 
unallowable. This last stipulation would have been 
particularly significant to some contractors in the Northeast. 
A number of contractor plants are located on sites that were 
used for textile production in the 19th century. A byproduct 
of the textile manufacturing process was coal-tar residues. 
Today, the current owners are being required by state and 
Federal agencies to remediate the 100 year old residues. Many 
of the costs would have been expressly unallowable per the 
proposed cost principle unless the contractor could prove a 
connection to an old Government contract, perhaps one for the 
manufacture of Civil War uniforms. [Ref. 22] 
Although the December 1991 draft addressed a number of 
issues pertaining to environmental cost allowability, it did 
not deal specifically with the allocability of environmental 
cleanup costs. A contracting officer in search of guidance was 
still faced with determining how to best allocate the costs of 
cleaning up contamination from yesterday's business to today's 
contracts. 
As stated earlier, the draft cost proposal elicited a 
variety of responses. A Federal Contracts Report article [Ref. 
20] stated that copies of the December 1991 draft were floated 
to a number of industry associations, which generally 
supported the draft. The article reported that "...industry 
has called existing regulatory coverage of environmental costs 
'woefully inadequate,' and has urged the government to 
promulgate a cost principle making such costs clearly 
allowable." [Ref. 20] This researcher found, however, that the 
conditional allowability of remediation costs was referred to 
as a "presumption of wrongdoing" by at least one industry 
association [Ref. 23] . The requirement to prove that 
remediation costs were not the result of wrongdoing and were 
legitimate  costs was  not viewed favorably.  Apparently, 
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industry wanted a clarifying cost principle only if it made 
environmental costs generally allowable. 
Evidently, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and the General Services Administration 
(GSA) had reservations about the proposed cost principle that 
reflected budgetary concerns [Ref. 20] . If so, this could 
indicate that these organizations believed that the proposed 
cost principle would result in too large a share of the 
remediation burden being borne by the Government in general 
and their programs in particular. It is then ironic that the 
next guidance on environmental costs provided to contracting 
personnel by the Director of Defense Procurement removed the 
conditional allowability and was actually based on the 
assumption that environmental costs should be treated as 
normal costs of doing business. 
B.  1992 ENVIRONMENTAL COST GUIDANCE 
On 14 October 1992, the DOD Director of Defense 
Procurement and DCAA released jointly developed guidance on 
how environmental costs should be treated under current cost 
principles and the Cost Accounting Standards [Ref. 24]. This 
guidance remains effective today and has been incorporated 
nearly verbatim into DCAA's audit manual [Ref. 25]. The 
guidance is based on the premise that, "Environmental costs 
are normal costs of doing business and are generally allowable 
costs if reasonable and allocable." [Ref. 24, p. 4] The 
"normal cost of doing business" premise is supplemented by the 
additional proviso that environmental costs are unallowable if 
the contractor was guilty of wrongdoing. [Ref. 24, p. 4] 
The 1992 Guidance addresses a number of issues. The 
sections of the guidance relevant to a discussion of the 
allocability issue are reviewed next. 
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1. Normal Business Expense 
The guidance addresses costs incurred to prevent 
environmental contamination and those incurred to clean up 
prior contamination: compliance and remediation costs. 
Directly associated costs such as legal expenses are also 
included as environmental costs by the guidance. Such 
compliance, remediation or directly associated costs are 
normal business expenses to the extent that, "...an ordinary, 
reasonable, prudent businessperson would incur in the course 
of conducting a competitive for-profit enterprise." [Ref. 24, 
p. 4] 
Not all normal business expenses, however, are allowable 
for Government contract costing: the tests of reasonableness, 
not specifically unallowable and allocability to a Government 
contract must also be met. [Ref. 26] 
2. Reasonableness 
In the discussion of environmental costs, the test of 
reasonableness is dual faceted. First, the actual costs 
themselves must be reasonable: " . ..consistent with the methods 
employed and the actions expected of an ordinary, reasonable, 
prudent businessperson performing non-Government contracts in 
a competitive marketplace." [Ref. 24, p. 4] Secondly, the 
circumstances of the cleanup costs must be examined for 
reasonableness to ensure that the contractor is not reimbursed 
for contamination that should have been avoided. Costs due to 
contractor delay in taking actions to mitigate the 
contamination after its discovery, even if there is no formal 
citation, are unallowable. [Ref. 24, p. 5] 
For example: the cost of a site survey may be reasonable 
in the sense that the cost is not inconsistent with that paid 
by other businesses in similar circumstances and that it was 
a necessary survey given the scenario. If, however, the 
contamination problem creating the need for such a survey was 
compounded by contractor inaction, some of the costs may be 
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unreasonable in the second sense and thus unallowable. 
Remediation costs that are the result of the contractor 
violating the law, regulations or permits, or disregarding 
warnings for the potential of contamination, are considered 
unreasonable and are, consequently, unallowable. [Ref. 24, p. 
5] 
For example: if the contractor's discharge permit limits 
the concentration of lead in its waste water to 5 parts-per- 
million (ppm) and the measured amount is 5 0 ppm, any resultant 
remediation costs would be unallowable. 
3o  Not Specifically Unallowable 
The second test associated with allowability excludes 
costs that are specifically unallowable. Generally, such costs 
are delineated in the Cost Principles, Part 31 of the FAR. 
Examples include costs of alcoholic beverages, bad debt 
expenses and most advertising. Also, specific costs may be 
unallowable due to the terms and conditions of a particular 
contract. [Ref. 13] 
4.  Allocability 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a cost is allocable 
to a Government contract if it is assignable to one or more 
cost objectives on "...the basis of relative benefit received 
or other equitable relationship." [Ref. 13]. A cost is 
allocable if one of the three following conditions is 
satisfied: [Ref. 13] 
1. The cost is incurred specifically for a contract 
as in the case of a direct cost such as Factory 
Labor or Material. 
2. The cost benefits more than one contract and is 
distributed to them in proportion to the benefit received 
across some allocation base. For example, utilities 
expenses may be incorporated in a Factory Overhead cost 
pool that is allocated over a Direct Factory Labor Hours 
base. 
3. Some costs are not directly linked to any one cost 
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objective, but are necessary for the operation of the 
business as a whole. Generally, such costs are 
accumulated in a General and Administrative (G&A) cost 
pool and allocated over a total cost input base. 
The 1992 Guidance bases the allocation of remediation 
costs on the last condition: costs necessary for the overall 
operation of the business. The guidance goes on to state that 
such remediation costs are generally period costs that should 
be allocated to the business segment associated with the 
contamination in accordance with CAS 403. The business unit 
"...should in turn allocate the cost to contracts as part of 
the segment residual G&A costs under CAS 410." [Ref. 24, p. 5] 
An example will depict the implications of the guidance 
to the extent of the discussion. 
Assume that $15 million in environmental survey costs 
have been incurred by a contractor's business unit to date. 
Assume also that the costs are reasonable and otherwise 
allowable. The costs will be accumulated in a G&A cost pool 
and allocated across total cost input. The Government will pay 
in proportion to its share of the total cost input. If 
Government contracts make up 50% of total production costs, 
the Government will pay 50% of the remediation costs through 
the G&A rates. Note that the share the Government pays is not 
based to any extent upon its participation in the generation 
of the contamination requiring remediation. It is conceivable 
that a single DOD contract resulted in 100% of the 
contamination: the Government would, consequently, not be 
paying in proportion to its participation. Conversely, the 
contractor's civilian business could have been the source of 
the contamination: the Government would then be paying more 
than its fair share. 
Since the 1992 Guidance refers to cleanup costs as a 
normal business expense, no mention is made of Government 
participation  in  the  contamination.  The proposed  Cost 
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Principle, conversely, linked reimbursement to participation. 
A number of related issues also discussed in the 1992 
Guidance affect the relatively simple allocation scenario 
presented thus far. These issues are discussed next. 
5.  Issues Related to Allocation 
A number of environmental cost issues addressed in the 
1992 Guidance are related to the allocation issue. They 
include: Costs from a Contractor's Previous Site, 
Capitalization of Environmental Costs, Responsibility for 
Clean Up as a Potentially Responsible Party, and Insurance 
Recoverability. 
a. Costs from a Contractor's Previous Site 
The 1992 Guidance regarding closed sites is 
predicated on the assumption that the business segment and its 
associated operations, irrespective of physical location, is 
the unit to which remediation costs are allocated. In the 
event that costs are incurred to remediate a site that a 
business unit previously occupied, the cleanup costs are to be 
transferred to the site where the work was moved. If the 
business segment is closed and no work remains in the company, 
the guidance states that such costs would not generally be 
allocable to other segments of the business. The guidance 
continues, however, to state that the circumstances of each 
case involving a closed segment must be reviewed to determine 
the exact cost allocation method to be used. Depending upon 
those circumstances, the costs may be allocated as residual 
home office costs per CAS 403, allocated directly to other 
segments or treated as an adjustment to the extraordinary 
costs of closing down the business segment. [Ref. 24, p. 5] 
The complexity of this issue is demonstrated by a case 
involving Lockheed. Groundwater contamination was discovered 
at its Burbank, California site in 1980. While remediation was 
in progress, the business unit and associated operations that 
caused the contamination were moved to Georgia. In response to 
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Air Force concerns that the business units remaining at the 
Burbank site would bear a disproportionate share of the 
cleanup costs and suffer higher overhead rates, the ACO and 
Lockheed negotiated an arrangement whereby the remediation 
costs would be spread across the entire Lockheed company and 
allocated per CAS 403 as residual corporate costs. DCAA 
questioned the arrangement because the costs were allocated on 
an ability to bear basis rather than to the business unit(s) 
associated with the costs by benefit or cause. DCAA indicated 
that the costs should be borne by the business unit 
transferred to Georgia or by the those remaining in Burbank, 
not spread across the entire company. If the business unit and 
associated operations had been discontinued, the Contracting 
Officer and Lockheed would have been able to make a better 
case for a corporate-wide allocation.  [Ref.  6,  p.  31] 
b.     Capitalization of Remediation Costs 
Environmental remediation costs are generally period 
costs to be expensed in the current period. A number of 
exceptions are noted in the 1992 Guidance. [Ref. 24, p. 3] 
First, if a cost constitutes an improvement and 
exceeds the capitalization threshold, it must be capitalized. 
The cost is generally considered an improvement if it improved 
the site in comparison to its condition at the time of 
purchase. For example, assume that a company acquires a 
property contaminated by a previous owner for $5 million. 
Cleanup costs of $10 million are incurred for groundwater 
remediation. The costs would be capitalized as an improvement 
and added to the book value of the land for a total of $15 
million. In this example, the contractor would not recover 
costs until the property was eventually sold. [Ref. 24, p. 4] 
Second, remediation costs incurred to cleanup a 
property held for sale will be capitalized if they are 
realizable from the transaction. For example, if $10 million 
is incurred to remediate a property with a book value of $5 
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million and a market value of $20 million, the remediation 
costs would be capitalized and recovered upon completion of 
the sale. In the event that the remediation costs were not 
realizable, as in the case of a $5 million sale price, the 
costs would be expensed in the current period. Note that any 
unrealizable costs that result in an improvement must still be 
capitalized. [Ref. 24, p. 4] 
Generally, remediation costs are current period 
expenses unless they represent improvements or are incurred to 
prepare a property for sell. 
c.     Cleanup Involving Third Parties 
The 1992 Guidance refers to all third parties 
responsible for contamination at a site as Potentially 
Responsible Parties (PRP) . PRP, however, is a term of law 
associated with the Comprehensive Environmental Response 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), generally known as 
Superfund. The term actually refers to a party that is 
financially liable under CERCLA for remediation at specific 
sites designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
on the National Priorities List (Superfund List). Any number 
of companies may be responsible for contamination at a given 
site, but under the joint and several liability provisions of 
CERCLA, any one may be held fully liable for all cleanup 
costs. CERCLA then provides a framework for the paying company 
to obtain compensation from other PRPs that contributed to the 
contamination. [Ref. 24, p. 7 and Ref. 28, p. 4] 
Third parties contributing to contamination at a 
defense contractor's site may indeed be PRPs if the site is on 
the Superfund List. If not, they are merely a third party 
contaminator. The 1992 Guidance makes reference, however, only 
to PRPs and, if literally interpreted, could be construed to 
apply only to contractors remediating Superfund sites. 
The guidance essentially states that allowable 
remediation costs include only that portion of the total 
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incurred to cleanup contamination for which the contractor was 
directly responsible. The contractor is responsible for 
obtaining compensation from other PRPs for remediation costs 
incurred to clean up their share of the contamination. [Ref. 
24, p. 7] 
In the event that the contractor is unable to 
collect from a PRP, the amount, including associated 
collection and legal costs, is considered to be "...in their 
essential nature, a bad debt" and, consequently is 
unallowable. [Ref. 24, p. 7] 
An example depicts the implications of the guidance. 
Assume that a company, under EPA order, expends $10 million to 
remediate a Superfund site. EPA determined that the company 
contributed to 25% of the contamination and that a now defunct 
corporation with no successors generated the remainder. Unable 
to collect from the out-of-business corporation, the company 
would find that $7.5 million of its remediation costs, an 
otherwise  normal  business  expense,  are  unallowable. 
d. Insurance Recovery 
The 1992 Guidance states that, "The insurance 
industry does not currently consider environmental 
contamination as an insurable risk (at reasonable cost) in 
most circumstances." [Ref. 24, p. 7] Polices written before 
the exclusion of environmental contamination as an insurable 
risk, however, may be sources of coverage for environmental 
damage and sources of funds for remediation. In the event that 
such policies result in insurance recoveries, the amounts are 
to be applied as credits against any allowable remediation 
costs. [Ref. 24, p. 7] 
The guidance points out that some of the 
contaminating events that generated the remediation costs may 
be covered under older policies that lacked specific 
environmental damage exclusions. Most insurance companies are 
contesting the claims, however, and payments, often only 
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partial settlements, are made after lengthy negotiations or 
expensive court battles. The guidance states that the 
Government should inquire into the possibility of insurance 
recovery and, if feasible, should insist that the contractor 
pursue it with due diligence. [Ref. 24, p. 7] 
Insurance recovery is also mentioned as an 
appropriate subject for advance agreements due to their 
contingent nature. The Contracting Officer would prefer to 
negotiate environmental costs net of insurance recovery. Given 
the uncertainty associated with recovery, the insurance 
policies and procedures for the application of future credits 
should be addressed in advance agreements. [Ref. 24, p. 7] 
After the 1992 Guidance was promulgated, a report 
[Ref. 6] entitled "Environmental Cleanup: Observations on the 
Consistency of Reimbursements to DOD Contractors" was 
published by the GAO. The report, dated 22 October 1992, 
contained four examples of how contractors' claims for cleanup 
costs were dealt with in different ways by different 
Contracting Officers. The report stated that: 
DOD's reimbursement to contractors in these cases 
occurred in different ways, with reimbursement 
decisions varying widely. Contractors were 
reimbursed through overhead in prime contracts, 
subcontracts, and a negotiated settlement. 
Decisions on reimbursement varied from complete 
denial to reimbursement in proportion to the 
government's share of company business. [Ref. 6, p. 
1] 
The inconsistency was attributed to a lack of specific 
guidance on the treatment of environmental costs [Ref. 6, p. 
2] This desire for consistency manifested in the GAO report 
contributed to the creation of DCMC's Environmental 
Initiatives Task Force Cost Allowance Program (Pilot Program) 
[Ref. 29]. 
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C.  1994 SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL COST GUIDANCE 
As part of the Pilot program, teams of contract 
administration and audit personnel were formed at five Defense 
Plant Representative Offices (DPRO) located in five contractor 
facilities. The teams were chartered to, "...capture best 
practices and ensure consistent application of existing 
regulations and guidelines." [Ref. 29] The lessons learned 
would then be incorporated into future guidance. Additionally, 
the pilot program was intended to identify information and 
methods that could be used by a Contracting Officer faced with 
a decision regarding the allowability of specific 
environmental costs. 
A number of questions regarding interpretation and 
application of the 1992 Guidance were raised by the Pilot 
Program teams. On 13 April 1994, supplemental guidance was 
released jointly by DCMC and DCAA. A number of key issues 
addressed in the supplemental guidance that bear on cleanup 
cost allocation are discussed next. 
1.  Capitalization 
The 1994 Guidance clarified a number of questions 
regarding capitalization of remediation costs. 
The supplemental guidance reinforced the notion that 
remediation costs incurred to cleanup property that was not 
contaminated when acquired should be expensed in the current 
period. The guidance also pointed out, however, that property 
and equipment, even if purchased or constructed to remediate 
a site, perhaps a pumping station or filtration unit, should 
be capitalized if the capitalization threshold is exceeded and 
depreciated over future periods. [Ref. 30, p. 1] 
Another key issue regarding capitalization of remediation 
costs was highlighted in the 1994 Guidance: remediation costs 
incurred to cleanup property that was contaminated by a prior 
owner are to be capitalized. This point was made to ensure 
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that the Government did not accept as current period costs 
expenditures that improve the contractor's assets. The 
guidance reinforces the consequences to the contractor: "The 
costs would not be amortized over future periods since land is 
not a depreciable asset." [Ref. 30, p. 3] 
Finally, if costs were incurred to cleanup a property 
held for sale because of a regulatory agency order or the land 
is unsafe in its present condition, they are to be expensed in 
the current period. This is true even if the costs are 
realizable from the sale. The 1994 Guidance continued by 
pointing out that if the costs resulting from the regulatory 
order or improving the safety exceeded the capitalization 
threshold or was an improvement, they should be capitalized. 
[Ref. 30, p. 5] 
2.     Potentially Responsible Parties 
The 1994 Guidance modified the guidance regarding PRPs in 
cases where the PRP is no longer in business and a successor 
company has not assumed its liabilities. The 1992 Guidance 
treated uncollectible amounts as unallowable bad debts [Ref. 
24, p. 7] . Based on a Director of Defense Procurement decision 
that reversed this policy, the 1994 Guidance stated that 
amounts uncollectible from out-of-business PRPs were not to be 
construed as bad debts since there was no company from which 
to recover [Ref. 30, p. 5] Although, not explicitly stated, 
the reader of the guidance is left to reasonably assume that 
such uncollectible amounts are now allowable provided that 
they are not otherwise or specifically unallowable and are 
allocable. 
The 1994 Guidance did not change with regard to the 
unallowability of costs from PRPs that remain in business. The 
contractor is still required to pursue recovery through the 
CERCLA mechanisms for Superfund sites or by arbitration and 
legal proceedings from third party contaminators. [Ref. 30, p. 
7] 
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Given the significant difference in the treatment of 
costs for remediating contamination caused by the contractor 
versus contamination caused by another PRP, it is not 
surprising that the guidance addresses the calculation of the 
contractor's share of the allowable cleanup costs in some 
detail. 
The 1994 Guidance states that the method used to 
determine a contractor's share of the contamination will 
depend upon the circumstances and the amount of information 
available. In any case, the Contracting Officer making the 
decision regarding the costs will require additional technical 
assistance. [Ref. 30, p. 9] 
It may be possible to associate a contaminant with a 
particular process, which in turn was used by only one of the 
PRPs. This procedure was referred to as technical 
fingerprinting in some of the interviews [Ref. 31 and 32]. As 
an example: assume that 25% of remediation costs were incurred 
to cleanup heavy metal in the groundwater. The heavy metal 
contamination was the result of a single process used 
exclusively by another PRP. Thus, 25% of the cleanup costs are 
attributable to the other PRP and are unallowable costs for 
the contractor. 
In the event that technical fingerprinting is 
unsuccessful due to a lack of information, the relative shares 
of the total cleanup responsibility would be based on another 
basis, such as the time period a PRP occupied a site. In the 
event of simultaneous occupancy, square footage occupied might 
provide a reasonable base to determine responsibility for 
cleanup. [Ref. 33] 
The 1994 Guidance continued to refer to all third party 
contaminators as PRPs and referred only to situations 
involving CERCLA and EPA mandated cleanups. Remediation 
ordered by state or local authorities was not specifically 
discussed. [Ref. 30, p. 7] 
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3.  Allocation of Cleanup Costs 
The 1992 Guidance stated that current period cleanup 
costs are allocated to Government contracts through the G&A 
pool in accordance with CAS 410. The 1994 Guidance added that 
such costs may be allocated by means of another indirect cost 
pool provided that the costs can be allocated in reasonable 
proportion to some causal or beneficial relationship to the 
cost objective per CAS 418. The 1994 Guidance continues by 
pointing out that this test will not be satisfied in most 
cases involving remediation costs since they are incurred in 
the current period to cleanup contamination that resulted from 
prior period work [Ref. 30, p. 10]. If, however, the product 
causing the contamination is still being manufactured, CAS 418 
could be used to allocate the associated cleanup costs through 
an overhead pool. As was pointed out in one interview, this 
would be the case particularly if a commercial product's 
manufacture had caused the contamination [Ref 34]. 
As a related note, use of the current DOD Weighted 
Guidelines will result in environmental costs being used to 
calculate profit if they are allocated via an overhead pool 
other than G&A. As a result, a larger fee or profit will 
result for a given contract when the cleanup costs are 
allocated by other than G&A. 
D.  ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES TASK FORCE COST ALLOWANCE 
PROGRAM (PILOT PROGRAM) 
As was mentioned previously, DCMC initiated a Pilot 
Program in March 1993 to capture best practices, to determine 
methods and information needed by Contracting Officers to make 
decisions regarding environmental costs and to update current 
guidance with lessons learned. The Pilot Program was 
intentionally open ended with no formal completion date "To 
enhance the learning experience..." and "...allow each team 
the flexibility to fully explore the issues and methods." 
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[Ref. 29] A 60 day reporting period was implemented for 
progress reports. 
As of this writing, the five Pilot Program teams have 
completed their reports and submitted them to DCMC for 
compilation and review [Ref. 34]. The results were briefed to 
the Director of Defense Procurement on 1 February 1995 [Ref. 
27] . 
Thirteen major environmental cost issues were addressed 
in the briefing. DCAA and DCMC had reached agreement on ten of 
the issues. Among the three issues not agreed upon were 
treatment of insurance recoveries and bad debt treatment of 
third party contaminator costs. The Director of Defense 
Procurement directed the formation of committees to study and 
resolve the remaining issues. No additional guidance will be 
promulgated to the Contracting community until agreement is 
reached. [Ref. 27] 
In a related development, the DAR Council was recently 
tasked with reopening the issue of an environmental Cost 
Principle. The DAR Council was tasked with answering two 
questions: Is a Cost Principle needed and what should it 
include? Due to the DAR Council's current preoccupation with 
the implementation of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
of 1994, it is not expected that it will begin work on an 
environmental Cost Principle in the near future. [Ref. 19] 
In this chapter the development and content of current 
DOD guidance regarding the allocation of environmental 
remediation costs was reviewed. This background material 
permits the reader to understand the issues related to the 




IV. ALLOCATING ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS 
The current guidance on environmental remediation costs 
rests on the assumption that such costs are normal business 
expenses. Government participation in the activities that 
caused the contamination is not mentioned as a prerequisite 
for allowability. Contracting Officers, tasked with 
application of the guidance, have interpreted it in a number 
of ways. The outcome is different allocation methods, each 
with differing consequences. 
This chapter describes a number of allocation methods 
that are analyzed later in the thesis. Additionally, issues 
related to the guidance and the methods are addressed. 
A.  ALTERNATIVE COST ALLOCATION METHODS 
The alternative methods are presented in four groups 
organized by the underlying assumptions. 
1.  Not Allocating Cleanup Costs 
This approach is based on the lack of a beneficial or 
causal relationship between current contracts and the 
contamination for which costs are being incurred to remediate. 
Since no current contracts caused or benefited from the 
contaminating activity, there is no contractual vehicle 
through which to equitably allocate the costs. Additionally, 
the remediation costs themselves actually reflect how much the 
contractor failed to assess the risk and underpriced the 
original contract. 
When a commercial firm engages in a contractual 
relationship with another, the price of the contract 
compensates the firm for risks undertaken. If the contracted 
process results in contamination, the firm cannot generally go 
to  its  customer  after  the  fact  to  seek  additional 
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compensation.3 A posteriori, the original contract was 
underpriced given the actual risk involved. The analogous view 
is that the Government, as the customer of a contractor, 
particularly in the case of a fixed-price agreement, has no 
responsibility for an ex post facto payment to the contractor. 
[Ref. 35] 
A similar argument is based on the idea that Government 
contracts generally do not direct contamination. Contractor 
practices caused the contamination. Many of those practices 
were common and accepted before laws and requirements were 
changed to reflect a growing understanding of the effects of 
environmental contamination. Even if the contract included 
specifications for use of materials and processes that 
resulted in the contamination, the contractor assumed the 
risks for doing business a certain way. The Government should 
not be required to pay. [Ref. 36] 
Emphasizing the lack of a beneficial or causal 
relationship to current contracts, this approach apparently 
overlooks that the 1992 Guidance, the FAR and CAS 410 all 
provide a mechanism for allocating such costs. A cost, lacking 
a beneficial or causal relationship, may be allocated if it is 
otherwise allowable and two conditions are satisfied. 
First, the cost allocation must be equitable: consistent, 
uniform and verifiable. This condition is not difficult to 
satisfy by a G&A allocation across a cost input base, for 
example. 
Second, the cost must be necessary for the overall 
operation  of  the  business. The  proponents  of  an 
nonallocability approach would, of course, argue that such 
3
 The customer firm may be held liable as a PRP under 
CERCLA if considered an arranger. The firm could be an 
arranger if it provided the material that resulted in the 
contamination or arranged for its disposal. [Ref. 29] 
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costs, representing underpriced contracts, are not necessary 
for operation of the firm today and that the Government should 
not pay for yesterday's poor business decisions. 
The nonallocability approach was mentioned as being the 
preferred method for dealing with the allocation issue in very 
few interviews or survey responses. Additionally, the 
researcher could find no case where it was actually cited as 
a reason for disallowing or questioning costs. Rather, other 
concerns, such as insurance indemnity or third party 
responsibility, were more frequently at issue. Given the clear 
statement by the Director of Defense Procurement in the 1992 
and 1994 Guidance that environmental expenses are normal costs 
of doing business, the nonallocability approach, although 
perhaps philosophically defensible, is untenable in 
implementation. 
The next group of allocation methods is based on the 
contrary assumption that cleanup costs are normal business 
expenses, necessary for the operation of the firm. 
2•  Cleanup Costs as Normal Business Expenses 
Fundamental to this approach is the idea that cleanup 
costs are a normal business expense. If reasonable, not 
specifically unallowable due to contract terms or FAR Part 31, 
and allocable to a Government contract, they are allowable. In 
some cases, it may be possible to establish a causal or 
beneficial link to current contracts. If so, an overhead 
allocation other than G&A would be used. 
a.     Overhead Allocation 
Although the 1994 Supplemental Guidance permits an 
allocation per CAS 418, it is unlikely that a beneficial or 
causal relationship to current cost objectives can be 
established given the time difference and the unlikelihood 
that the same product line is being manufactured today. 
In the event that an overhead allocation could be 
substantiated, all otherwise allowable cleanup costs would be 
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allocated to cost objectives across the appropriate contractor 
base. For example, if accumulated in a facilities overhead 
pool, they might be allocated on the basis of square footage. 
The only requirement to use an overhead allocation 
is to show a causal or beneficial relationship to current cost 
objectives, including Government contracts. No effort is made 
to establish a relationship between the current allocation and 
the degree of Government participation in the contracts that 
caused the contamination. 
Also, such an overhead allocation would increase 
overhead rates and, consequently, profit or fee calculated in 
accordance with current DOD guidelines. 
b.     G&A Allocation 
Allocability, since there is generally no direct 
beneficial or causal relationship to a cost objective, 
generally depends upon whether or not the costs are necessary 
for operation of the entire business. If the argument for 
necessity is accepted, the costs may be allocated. 
The necessity argument can be expressed in a number 
of ways. The business and its facility cannot continue 
operating unless the contamination is remediated; thus, the 
cleanup costs are necessary to the survival of the 
organization [Ref. 34]. The costs could also be viewed as the 
responsibility of a corporate citizen and necessary for 
continued commercial viability [Ref. 28, p. 52]. In an 
approach similar to that taken by Lockheed in a case involving 
commercial inventory taxes, which was discussed in Chapter II, 
it could be argued that all employees, and consequently, all 
work benefits from the cleaner environment [Ref. 8, p. 14]. 
Provided that the necessity argument is accepted, 
which is likely the case for EPA, court or State mandated 
cleanups, the guidance indicates that the costs should be 
allocated. No mention is made of establishing a relationship 
between the contamination and a Government contract, past or 
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present. 
In a number of interviews, the need to establish a 
connection between a Government contract and the contamination 
was described as being irrelevant to the allocation problem 
given the policy of recognizing cleanup expenses as a normal 
cost of doing business. For example: 
If the remediation costs are a normal cost of doing 
business, why care about the nexus between a 
Government contract and pollution today? [Ref. 19] 
In accordance with Ms. Spector, its a normal cost 
of doing business. This means not being entangled 
in reopening old contracts. Allocate to the current 
period. [Ref. 27] 
The logical result of the guidance, the normal 
business expense assumption, and the lack of a need to 
establish a relationship between the contamination is 
essentially an ability-to-bear allocation method. 
If environmental remediation costs of the current 
period were accumulated in a G&A pool, they would be allocated 
across a base that represented the total activity of the 
business unit. For contractors required to comply with CAS 
410, one of the three cost input bases would be used: 
production costs, value added or a single factor cost. Under 
such an allocation, the contractor is allowed to recover all 
otherwise allowable cleanup costs on an ability-to-bear basis 
from the current mix of business. [Refs. 13 and 16] 
Costs for equipment or facilities that were 
capitalized due to exceeding the capitalization threshold 
would be amortized and expensed through the G&A pool. Again, 
the cleanup costs would be recovered on an ability-to-bear 
basis.4 
4
 Note that in accordance with the 1992 and 1994 
Guidance, all costs that represented improvements would be 
capitalized and not realized until a sale occurred. 
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Whether allocated as an overhead or G&A expense, the 
normal business expense designation of the cleanup costs 
permits them to be allocated without establishing links to 
Government contracts that might have contributed to the 
contamination. The next group of methods is based on attempts 
to link Government contracts to the contamination as a basis 
for establishing the Government's fair share of the cleanup 
costs. 
3.  Cleanup Costs and the Fair Share 
A number of surveys and interviews of Contracting 
Officers included statements such as, "The Government should 
pay cleanup costs, but only its fair share." [Refs. 22, 31, 
32, and 37] These comments seemed to mirror the testimony of 
the Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security), Ms. 
Sherri Wasserman, before the House of Representative's 
Committee on Government Operations; 
If environmental damage occurred despite the 
exercise of due care by a contractor which complied 
with specific laws and regulations and conducted 
its business in accordance with standard industry 
practices, if that contractor spent reasonable 
amounts in a cost effective manner to remedy 
environmental damage, and if that contractor has 
previously sought reimbursement from all 
contributory sources...it may be that the U.S. 
Government should pay its fair share, but only its fair share of that contractor's costs, (emphasis 
added) [Ref. 38] 
Yet, the question of paying a fair share is significantly 
different than paying cleanup costs as a normal business 
expense if it involves explicit attempts to establish 
relationships between prior DOD contracts and the 
contamination. 
5
 Hereafter, DOD contracts will be referred to separately 
from other Government contracts to emphasize the effects of 
the alternative methods. 
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The consequences of the two approaches significantly 
differ. Under the normal business expense premise, all 
otherwise allowable cleanup costs are fully allocated. Under 
the fair share assumption, only those costs incurred to 
cleanup contamination linked to DOD contracts are allocated. 
This assumption is more akin to the proposed 1992 
environmental cost principle [Ref. 20] than to the promulgated 
1992 and 1994 Guidance [Refs. 24 and 30]. Yet, as will be 
seen, it is the approach favored and apparently implemented by 
Contracting Officers in the field. 
a. Technical  Fingerprints 
Technical fingerprinting, as used in the interviews, 
is the establishment of a relationship between specific DOD 
contracts and the contamination being remediated [Refs. 32 and 
37] . A variety of references are examined to determine the 
likely source of a contaminant: old contracts, internal 
production records, technical specifications, maintenance 
records, and supplier purchase orders. 
The purpose of the fingerprinting is to determine 
what share of the cleanup costs should be allocated to DOD. 
For example, if the contaminant being remediated is PCB, 
records would be examined for possible sources. If PCB was 
used in a sole civilian product manufactured 20 years ago at 
the facility, the lack of a connection to DOD business and 
application of the fair share assumption would preclude its 
allocation. The facts, however, are often more complicated. If 
the PCB was also used as a weed killer at the facility, DOD 
contracts benefited in an indirect manner; an argument could 
be made for a connection and an allocation. 
At an FMC site in the San Francisco Bay Area, the 
majority of the contaminants were technically fingerprinted to 
specific processes and contracts. Very little commercial work 
was undertaken at the facility during the period when the 
contamination occurred so the issue was not clouded by the 
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possibility of a substantial commercial contribution to the 
contamination. As a result, the DOD and FMC are negotiating 
the exact percentage of the estimated $100 to $120 million in 
cleanup costs, of which about one third has been incurred, 
that will be allocated via G&A. [Ref. 39] 
At other contractor sites, the links are not so 
easily established. In one case, many of the contracts 
couldn't be found and the contractor engaged the services of 
attorneys who were tasked with locating appropriate 
documentation [Ref. 40]. A Contracting Officer working on the 
Pilot Program pointed out that fingerprinting was not simple: 
layers upon layers of contamination and many different owners 
make it difficult to pinpoint the source and the time period 
[Ref. 27]. 
As an alternative to technical fingerprinting, where 
there is inadequate information to assign the sources of the 
contamination, an alternative method used to establish a fair 
share is the business mix. 
b.     The Business Mix 
The use of a business mix to determine DOD 
participation in the events that led to the contamination 
rests on the assumption that the contamination generated is 
directly proportional to the dollar value of the business. 
Such an assumption, given the unavailability of complete 
information, may be the only alternative as a basis for 
negotiating costs with the contractor. 
For example, if DOD contracts made up 50% of the 
business unit's cost input or sales during the time when it is 
believed that the contamination occurred, 50% of the current 
remediation costs should be allocated to DOD contracts. 
Although such a method provides a starting point for 
negotiations, this method is not frequently used to establish 
DOD's exact fair share. One member of DCAA's Policy and Plans 
Group stated that she knew of only one case where the cleanup 
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costs were allocated on a business mix basis [Ref. 33]. One 
Contracting Officer stated that he would use a business mix 
approach if technical fingerprinting was infeasible [Ref. 31] . 
c.     The Allocation of the Fair Share 
Given that a fair share is established by technical 
fingerprinting, a business mix approach or some combination of 
the two, the actual allocation must be determined. Two 
alternatives were identified during the interviews. 
The first method, a factored allocation, is to allow 
only that percentage of the cleanup costs that represent the 
DOD's portion to the G&A pool. That portion would then be 
allocated to current contracts across the contractor's 
allocation base. In a business unit performing nearly all DOD 
work, the DOD would pay the bulk of the fair share portion. 
Conversely, as the amount of commercial or non-DOD work 
increased, the DOD contracts would bear less of the fair share 
portion. [Ref. 32] 
The second method is essentially a special 
allocation to DOD contracts [Ref. 32] . CAS 410 permits a 
special allocation in cases where the benefits accruing to the 
cost objective from the G&A costs are disproportionate. In 
such a case, the DOD's fair share portion would be allocated 
only to current DOD contracts [Ref. 16]. 
Whether a factored or special allocation is used, 
spreading out the allocable costs over future periods is also 
an option [Refs. 40 and 41]. This was specifically mentioned 
as an alternative when agreement had been reached in the 
current year on the treatment of cleanup costs incurred over 
a number of previous years. Such an allocation would minimize 
the increase in G&A rates and the subsequent effects on DOD 
budget holders, which would be the case if multiple years 
cleanup costs were recovered in a single year [Ref. 40]. 
Fundamental to the previous two groups of allocation 
methods is the assumption that cleanup cost recovery will be 
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obtained by means of an allocation through the cost accounting 
system. The next section deals with possible cost recovery 
methods that do not make use of a cost allocation. 
4.  Recovery of Remediation Costs Without a Cost 
Allocation 
At least one Contracting Officer is attempting to combine 
technical fingerprinting with reimbursement of the contractor 
independent of a cost allocation. The contractor has engaged 
a firm of attorneys to search through old records to establish 
a link between the contaminants and DOD contracts. Once the 
links have been established, the cost of remediating the 
portion of the contamination caused by the DOD contracts will 
be calculated. The total will be segregated on the basis of 
the Military Department for which the contracts were 
performed. The Contracting Officer will then seek direct 
reimbursement from the appropriate Military Department for its 
fair share of the cleanup costs. [Ref. 40] 
The Contracting Officer's rationale for this approach is 
to avoid skyrocketing overhead rates. If this approach is not 
acceptable to the Military Departments, he plans to allocate 
the costs via G&A. [Ref. 40] 
A second and similar approach would be to use Public Law 
85-804 to grant the contractor extraordinary contractual 
relief. 
a. Public Law 85-804 
Public Law 85-804 provides the authority to permit 
the Government to amend and modify defense related contracts 
without regard to other provisions of the law. This authority 
is based on the recognition that in support of the national 
security, normal contracting laws are sometimes inadequate. 
Congressional consent is required for all relief granted in 
excess of $25 million. [Ref. 42, p. 23-2] 
Two forms of relief could apply in the case of 
environmental   cleanup   costs.   An   amendment   without 
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consideration can be made by the Government when an actual or 
threatened loss of a defense contract will impair the 
productive capacity of a contractor whose continued operation 
is essential to the national security [Ref. 43, p. 880]. If 
the magnitude of the cleanup costs was so great that the 
contractor's viability was threatened, such an argument could 
be used. In this case, the Government could grant relief, or 
payment, for cleanup costs to the fair share level as 
determined by technical fingerprinting or business mix. 
Additional relief has also been granted in cases 
involving indemnification against unusually hazardous risks 
[Ref. 42, p. 23-13]. Additional relief has been a basis for 
indemnity payments under contracts connected with nuclear and 
missile programs where commercial insurance is either limited 
or unavailable. [Ref. 43, p. 882] A similar approach could be 
used to grant relief to contractors that contaminated their 
facilities because they were working on a Government contract. 
Today, environmental damage is generally not an insurable risk 
and, even if it was not specifically excluded in older 
comprehensive liability policies, recovery through the courts 
has been difficult and costly [Ref. 24, p. 7]. Using this 
approach, the contamination would be fingerprinted and Public 
Law 85-804 would be used as a vehicle to pay the Government's 
fair share. 
A recent GAO report indicates that the Army has in 
fact used Public Law 85-804 to reimburse a contractor for $5 
million in environmental cleanup costs incurred at an 
ammunition plant in Wisconsin [Ref. 44] . The relief was 
granted to ensure that the corporation could continue to 
produce material deemed necessary for the national defense. In 
1992, a Secretary of the Army memorandum of decision 
authorized inclusion of Public Law 85-804 to indemnify 
contractors for unusually hazardous risks, including 
environmental contamination. The Navy continues to indemnify 
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contractors only in limited circumstances involving low-level 
radioactive waste, not environmental damage in general. The 
Air Force does not use Public Law 85-804 to indemnify 
environmental cleanup. [Ref. 44] 
Jb. Defense Environmental Restoration Account 
(DERÄ) 
Established in 1984, DERA is a source of funding 
used to fund remediation under the Defense Environmental 
Restoration Program (DERP) of Government-owned, contractor 
operated (GOCO) facilities or sites formally owned or operated 
by DOD. Many of the formally operated sites date back to the 
two World Wars and involve the removal of hazardous munitions 
and contaminants. As of 1989, 8,000 sites at 897 DOD 
installations had been identified as possibly requiring 
remediation. Under DERP, a site is assessed and either DOD 
contracts for remediation or the contractor remediates the 
site and is reimbursed from DERA. [Ref. 45] 
Although DERA funds cannot be used for remediating 
a contractor owned site, it does provide an example of 
financing cleanup at a contractor facility independent of a 
cost allocation. 
Four groups of allocation methods have been discussed. In 
the next section, a number of issues related to cleanup cost 
allocations are examined. 
Bo  ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH CLEANUP COST ALLOCATION METHODS 
In this section, the issues of insurance recovery, third 
party contaminators, unused sites and their effects on 
remediation cost allocations are addressed. 
1.  Insurance Recovery 
The 1992 Guidance on environmental costs pointed out that 
many earlier policies did not generally exclude environmental 
cleanup costs and, consequently, are a source of recovery. 
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Most insurance companies, however, are fighting such claims in 
the courts and any resultant payments are often based on 
partial settlements. The guidance states that, "Where a claim 
is possible and economically feasible, the contractor should 
pursue it." [Ref. 24, p. 7] The guidance also points out that 
any insurance recoveries should be applied as credits against 
allowable cleanup costs. [Ref. 24, p. 7] 
The complexity of insurance recovery is daunting. One 
company with 368 carriers has settled with 56; some cases are 
in court as long as seven years; and whoever losses, appeals 
[Ref. 27]. Another company has several hundred sites with 
several hundred insurers [Ref. 22]. It is no wonder that one 
Contracting Officer stated that 65% of a contractor's 
remediation costs were legal expenses [Ref. 40]. 
The guidance states that the timing and amount of 
insurance claims for contract costing purposes is a subject of 
negotiations between the Contracting Officer and the 
contractor [Ref. 24, p. 4] . One Contracting Officer pointed 
out that essentially two options were available with regard to 
timing of the claims. One is to not allow cleanup costs until 
all recovery efforts have been exhausted. The second option is 
to allow the remediation costs and ensure that the company 
diligently pursues recovery. Recoveries would then be credited 
to the Government. [Ref. 40] 
The first alternative is based on FAR 31.205-19 (a) (3), 
which states that actual losses incurred under covered 
insurance are unallowable. This Cost Principle has been cited 
by the auditors as a basis for questioning environmental costs 
in at least one case where there was only a possibility of 
insurance recovery from a General Comprehensive Liability 
policy [Ref. 46]. In response to a request for clarification 
from the auditors, a DCAA letter stated that although explicit 
insurance coverage had not been established, only unreasonable 
actions, such as having intended the contamination to occur, 
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would preclude eventual coverage [Ref. 47]. It was not 
necessary for definite coverage to be established for the 
auditors to question the costs. 
Because of the FAR provision forbidding covered losses, 
the second approach would be used where the likelihood of 
insurance recovery was low. Advance agreements would delineate 
contractor and DOD responsibilities with respect to contractor 
recovery efforts and DOD reimbursement in the event of 
recovery. Advance agreements on insurance credits could also 
be used to incentivize the contractor to pursue recovery. For 
example, a 1991 settlement with Aerojet-General Corporation on 
environmental costs incurred before 1989 included provisions 
for Aerojet to reimburse DOD 50% of any future insurance 
recoveries [Ref. 6, p. 18]. 
Should the Contracting Officer delay agreement on 
environmental costs pending ultimate insurance recovery, the 
costs will generally be rolled forward with the intent to 
incorporate them in the first open, non-negotiated year [Ref. 
40]. If such costs are eventually included in the G&A pool, 
they will most likely inflate G&A rates for the year in 
question unless, as in the case of FMC, they are amortized 
over some future period [Ref. 39]. 
From either a normal business expense or fair share 
perspective, the possibility of insurance recovery will affect 
which portion of the otherwise allowable cleanup costs can be 
allocated in the current period. 
2.  Third Party Contaminators 
At many sites, previous owners or co-occupants 
contributed to the contamination that is being remediated. 
Under the joint and several liability provisions of CERCLA, 
the contractor currently occupying the site can be held 
entirely liable for the cleanup costs. The 1992 and 1994 
Guidance, however, allows only remediation costs incurred to 
cleanup the contamination caused by the contractor. The 
contractor must seek recovery from third party contaminators 
via the CERCLA mechanism, generally in the courts [Ref. 28, p. 
4]. The 1992 Guidance characterized amounts unrecoverable from 
third parties as bad debts and unallowable [Ref. 24, p. 7]. 
This prevents DOD from being used as a universal source of 
cleanup funds, a proverbial deep pocket. 
The 1994 Supplemental Guidance modified the bad debt 
characterization to allow unrecoverable costs if the third 
party contaminator was out of business and no successor 
company existed [Ref. 30, p. 8] . As a consequence, contractors 
whose facilities are located on sites contaminated by 
nineteenth century textile mills are actually able to recover 
cleanup costs, as normal business expenses, from DOD 
contracts. Uncollectible amounts from surviving businesses are 
still treated as bad debts. As a consequence of this 
treatment, contractors sometimes seek recourse in litigation 
to recover cleanup costs from third parties [Ref. 32]. 
To illustrate this result of treating unrecovered amounts 
as bad debts, assume that a contractor incurred $10 million to 
cleanup a site. A surviving third party was co-located at the 
site. An independent assessor was able to fingerprint the 
third party firm's contribution to 60% of the total 
contamination and determined that $6 million represented their 
fair share of the cleanup costs. The contractor and the third 
party then reached a negotiated settlement for $4 million. The 
remaining $2 million, according to the guidance, is questioned 
by the auditors as an unallowable bad debt and will not be an 
allowable cost. If the contractor is to recover the remaining 
$2 million, he must generally litigate. [Ref. 32] 
The question of third party liability is complicated by 
capitalization issues. If a site was already contaminated when 
acquired, the costs incurred by the current owner to cleanup 
the property may be construed as an improvement to the 
property. The costs are capitalized and, since the property is 
59 
not a depreciable asset, recovery of the costs will generally 
be delayed until ultimate sale. Even upon sale, the portion 
attributable to a surviving business will be characterized as 
a bad debt and unallowable. [Ref. 24, p.7 and Ref. 30, p. 7] 
There is, as a result of the bad debt and capitalization 
provisions, a premium on an ability to fingerprint the 
contamination to either the current contractor or a third 
party, whether a prior owner or co-located company. The issue 
is very relevant to determining which costs will be 
characterized as unallowable bad debts and which will be 
allowable; which will be capitalized and which will be 
expensed in the current period. Given that many of the sites 
in question have long histories of industrial use, technical 
fingerprinting of the current contractor's share is often 
difficult. The question of fingerprinting a third party's 
contribution certainly complicates the application of a fair 
share methodology; it was cited as a rationale for treating 
otherwise allowable cleanup costs as a normal business expense 
[Ref. 27]. 
3=   Unoccupied Sites 
Contractor sites sometimes remain unoccupied pending 
remediation and sale. Often, the property must be remediated 
before the property can be sold because of a regulatory agency 
order or a concern for safety. Such sites are referred to as 
orphan sites [Ref. 38]. 
When contamination at a site can be connected to a 
product line or business unit that survives at another 
location, the 1992 Guidance requires that the cleanup costs 
follow the business [Ref. 24, p. 5] . The transferred costs, if 
otherwise allowable, will be allocated to the business unit's 
contracts at the new site. In many cases, however, the product 
line or business unit no longer survives. The associated costs 
may then be allocated as residual expenses across the entire 
company per CAS 403 [Ref. 24, p. 5]. This was referred to as 
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an up-and-down allocation in one interview [Ref. 35]. 
The issue of costs incurred to remediate an orphan site 
may be moot, however, if the site has been vacant or idle for 
some period of time. The 1994 Guidance points out that costs 
incurred at idle facilities, usually after one year, are 
unallowable per FAR 31.205-17. Strict application of the idle 
plant provision has far reaching implications for a contractor 
with orphan sites that must be remediated prior to sale. The 
remediation process often takes years to accomplish and if the 
site is not used for production, it could be construed as idle 
[Ref. 6, pp. 14, 22 and 28] 
The interaction of the insurance, third party and orphan 
site issues greatly complicate the allocation issue. Faced 
with a claim for cleanup costs at an orphan site, for example, 
the Contracting Officer must answer a myriad of questions even 
if he takes a normal business expense approach and does not 
require that specific links be established between DOD 
contracts and the contamination: 
• Are the cleanup costs reasonable? 
• Was the contamination the result of contractor 
wrongdoing? 
• Is there a possibility of insurance recovery? If so, 
for what portion of the claimed costs? 
• Was the property contaminated when it was acquired? How 
much? If so, is the prior owner still in business? 
• Do the costs represent an improvement? Do they exceed 
the capitalization threshold? 
• Is there a regulatory order to remediate the site? Is 
it currently unsafe? 
• Was the original business unit's work transferred to 
another site? How much of the contamination was caused 
by the transferred unit? 
• Was the site idle? For how long? 
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© Did a third party, other than the original owner, 
contribute to the contamination? How much? Is this 
third party still in business? 
As can be seen from these questions, even a normal 
business expense approach requires determination of which 
occupant or owner contributed to how much of the 
contamination. Use of the fair share approach, however, 
requires even greater technical information. Essentially, the 
contribution of every contract and product line to the 
contamination must be determined so that a fair share can be 
calculated for DOD and for the contractor's other business. 
The apparent dichotomy between the normal business 
expense approach delineated in the guidance and the fair share 
approach implemented in the field does not bode well for 
consistent application of current FAR and CAS provisions. The 
need to resolve associated issues such as third parties and 
insurance recovery, which often requires information not 
available, further compounds the problem. In the next chapter, 
informal survey results are discussed to highlight the use of 
alternative methods. 
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V. INFORMAL SURVEY RESULTS 
A questionnaire, which included a hypothetical cost 
allocation problem, was sent to Contracting Officers and 
Contract Specialists at 50 DCMAOs and DPROs. The survey was 
intended to capture a consensus from the respondents of how 
cleanup costs should be treated in simplified cases not 
involving insurance recovery, third party contaminators, 
capitalization issues or contractor wrongdoing. Given three 
scenarios, the respondents were asked to select the best 
allocation method from five choices. Additionally, they were 
asked whether or not they believed that an Environmental Cost 
Principle is necessary. 
A.  THE SCENARIOS AND RESPONSES 
The initial survey scenario was based on a growing 
proportion of DOD contracts in a hypothetical firm's business 
base. The scenario follows: 
A major defense contractor incurred $15 million in 
environmental survey and monitoring costs while 
remediating contamination at one of its operating 
plants. The contamination, which occurred between 
1960 and 1975, could have been caused by work on 
either defense and commercial contracts, or both. 
Between 1960 to 1975, 20% of the contractor's 
revenues at the site were from defense contracts; 
8 0% was from commercial work. Today, the 
contractor's work at the site is 95% defense 
related. 
Five cost allocation methods were listed and the 
respondent was asked to select the approach that best 
described how they would allocate the otherwise allowable 
environmental remediation costs. 
The alternative responses were designed to reflect the 
major groups of cost allocation methods described in Chapter 
IV. The first alternative was based on the nonallocability 
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argument; it stated that the cleanup costs were not allocable 
and thus unallowable. 
The second response was an implementation of the fair 
share approach as determined by technical fingerprinting. The 
costs would be allocable, but only if a connection was shown 
to have existed between DOD contracts and the contamination. 
The amount of the cleanup costs allocated would depend on the 
DOD fair share. 
The third response was also based on the fair share 
approach, but used the business mix when the contamination 
occurred to determine DOD's portion. Thus, in the first 
scenario, DOD would bear 20% of the cleanup costs. 
The fourth response was an implementation of the normal 
business expense approach. The response indicated that the 
entire $15 million should be allocated through the G&A pool. 
Consequently, in the first scenario, DOD contracts would bear 
about 95% of the cleanup costs in spite of comprising 20% of 
the firm's business during the period when the contamination 
occurred. 
The last response was based on an up-and-down allocation 
per CAS 403. This response was intended to permit modification 
of the scenario to include an orphan site. 
The responses to the first scenario are tabulated in 
Table 2. 
ALLOCATION METHOD % 
Costs are unallocable 7.1% 
Fair share established by 
technical fingerprinting 
14.3% 
Fair share established by 
business mix 
53.6% 
Normal business expense 10.7% 
Up and down per CAS 403 14.3% 
Table 2 Summary of Responses to Scenario 1 
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Note that the combined total of the fair share approaches 
was 67.9%. This compares to 10.7% for the normal business 
expense approach. Given that over 70% of the respondents were 
Administrative Contracting Officers (CACOs, DACOs and ACOs), 
the selection of a fair share approach by a two-to-one margin, 
in spite of the current DOD guidance treatment of cleanup 
costs as a normal business expense, may be significant. 
The second scenario was a reversal of the business mix at 
the time the contamination occurred and during the current 
period. Thus, 95% of the work was defense related between 1960 
and 1975 and 2 0% today. This reversal was 
intended to gauge the consistency of the responses. For 
example, a respondent may not be as reluctant to use a normal 
business expense approach when DOD stands to pay significantly 
less, as in scenario 2, than under a fair share approach. 
The responses to the second scenario are tabulated in 
Table 3. 
ALLOCATION METHOD 0 
Costs are unallocable 7.1% 
Fair share established by 
technical fingerprinting 
17.9% 
Fair share established by 
business mix 
46.4% 
Normal business expense 14.3% 
Up and down per CAS 4 03 14.3% 
Table 3 Summary of Responses to Scenario 2 
The respondents were relatively consistent in spite of 
the scenario change: 64.4% selected a fair share approach and 
14.3% the normal business expense treatment. 
The final scenario posited that the facility had been 
closed for 20 years. This change was intended to capture the 
consequences of an orphan site. The responses to the last 
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scenario are tabulated in Table 4 
ALLOCATION METHOD % 
Costs are unallocable 14.3% 
Fair share established by- 
technical fingerprinting 
10.7% 
Fair share established by- 
business mix 
39.3% 
Normal business expense 3.6% 
Up and down per CAS 4 03 32.1% 
Table 4 Summary of Responses to Scenario 3 
The last scenario was not specific as to whether or not 
the business unit's work had been transferred to another site. 
Accordingly, the number of respondents selecting a CAS 403 
allocation increased, which is one alternative per the 1992 
guidance if no unit within the company is performing the same 
work today. 
The researcher was surprised that more respondents did 
not select the nonallocability response on the basis that the 
facility had been shutdown for 20 years and the costs were 
incurred to remediate an idle facility. Viewed from a fair 
share perspective, however, it makes sense that DOD should pay 
for some remediation costs if its contracts, no matter how 
long ago, contributed to the contamination. 
B.  THE NEED FOR AN ENVIRONMENTAL COST PRINCIPLE 
The respondents were asked if they believed that current 
guidance is adequate for determining how remediation costs 
should be allocated or if an Environmental Cost Principle is 
needed. Of those responding, 82.1% indicated that an 
Environmental Cost Principle is needed; 17.8% believed that 
the current guidance is adequate. 
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C.  SURVEY CONCLUSIONS 
The researcher believes the following conclusions may be 
inferred from the informal survey results: 
1„ There is a preference among those contract 
administration personnel who responded for a fair share 
approach to remedial cost allocations. 
2. The preference for a fair share approach is relatively 
consistent. 
3. Contract administration personnel who responded 
believe that an Environmental Cost Principle is needed. 
The next chapter analyzes the effects of each allocation 
method with regard to the amount of information needed to 
implement each method, effects on overhead rates, 
repercussions to a declining DOD budget and consequences to a 
contractor attempting to enter a commercial marketplace. 
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VI. ANALYSIS OF REMEDIATION COST ALLOCATION METHODS 
A number of methods are available to Contracting Officers 
for allocating environmental remediation costs to DOD 
contracts. In this chapter, those methods, discussed in the 
previous two chapters, are analyzed. 
The following characteristics of the cost allocation 
methods are examined: 
• The amount of information about the source of the 
contamination being remediated that is needed to 
implement each method and the cost that either the 
Government or the contractor is willing to incur to 
obtain that information. 
• Effects of the allocation methods when the DOD 
component of a contractor's business base is decreasing 
or increasing. 
• Effects of a contractor's decision to diversify into 
commercial work. 
• Affects on overhead rates. 
• Cost allocation criteria including fairness. 
Finally, reasons for the divergence between the normal 
business expense focus of the current guidance and Contracting 
Officers' fair share applications are discussed. 
To illustrate the analysis, the scenario outlined in the 
informal survey is used to illustrate the relative amounts of 
information needed to implement each method. Recall that in 
the scenario, $15 million in remediation costs were incurred 
in the current period. The costs are otherwise allowable: they 
are reasonable, not specifically unallowable per the Cost 
Principles or contract, and were not incurred due to 
contractor wrongdoing. The current DOD business base is 95% of 
the contractor's total cost input. The DOD business base 
during 1960 to 1975, when the contamination was believed to 
have occurred, was 20%. 
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Ä.  INFORMATION REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT 
In this section the relative amount of information 
regarding the source and timing of the contamination that is 
being remediated is discussed. Additionally, incentives for 
both DOD and the contractor to incur additional information 
costs are addressed. 
1. No Allocation 
In the event that remediation costs are determined to be 
nonallocable to current contracts on the basis of no causal or 
beneficial relationship or because the costs are not necessary 
for overall operation of the business, very little information 
regarding the prior contamination is required. The costs, 
unallowable due to nonallocability, will be eliminated from 
indirect cost pools and will not be allocated to the various 
cost objectives. 
2. Normal Business Expense 
In accordance with the normal business expense method, 
remediation costs are accumulated in the G&A pool and 
allocated across the contractor's current total cost input. 
Conceptually, this method requires very little information 
about when the contamination occurred or what caused it, other 
than to establish that the remediation costs were reasonable 
and not due to contractor wrongdoing. It is not necessary to 
obtain information to establish a nexus between a prior DOD 
contract and the contamination being remediated. In the 
scenario, $14.25 million of the remediation costs would be 
allocated to DOD contracts. 
Even when a normal business expense approach is used, the 
presence of third party contaminators immediately complicates 
the scenario and increases the amount of information needed to 
implement the method. Enough information must be available to 
apportion responsibility between the contractor and third 
parties. The contractor can only recover remediation costs for 
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contamination that he caused or was caused by a non-surviving 
third party through an indirect cost allocation. Other third 
party costs must be recovered through the CERCLA mechanism. In 
cases where the contractor believes that a surviving third 
party's share is underestimated, he is likely to incur 
additional information costs to more accurately fix 
responsibility. 
Some portion of the additional information costs will in 
turn be reimbursed by the Government. In the case of a cost 
reimbursement contract, the reimbursement will be via indirect 
rates applied to allowable direct costs incured. In the case 
of a fixed-price contract, the reimbursement will be obtained 
through negotiated overhead rates. For example: assume that 
DOD believes 50% of the contamination at the contractor's site 
was due to a surviving third party. This would result in $7.5 
million being accumulated in the G&A pool and $7,125 million 
being ultimately allocated to DOD contracts under a normal 
business expense approach. If the contractor hires a firm of 
attorneys for $1 million who establish third party 
responsibility at only 25%, $12.25 million (75% of the $15 
million plus the $1 million attorney's fees) will be 
accumulated in the G&A pool and $11,638 million allocated to 
DOD contracts. Note that if the third party responsibility had 
initially been fixed at 25%, only $10,688 million would have 
been allocated to DOD contracts. The difference is DOD's 
portion of the information costs. 
3.  Business Mix 
The business mix method requires that the DOD business 
base at the time the contamination occurred be used to 
establish a DOD fair share. This method rests on the 
assumption that the business mix is somehow proportional to 
DOD's responsibility for the contamination. In the scenario, 
$2.85 million would be allocated to DOD contracts. 
Although the task of estimating DOD's share of the 
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business base in a given year is not difficult, exactly 
determining the years during which the contamination occurred 
may be more problematic. For example, if the contamination in 
the scenario didn't actually occur between 1960 and 1975, but 
during another period when DOD made up 80% of the business, it 
may be in the contractor's interest to incur additional 
information costs to establish exactly when the contamination 
occurred. Again, as in the case of the normal business expense 
discussion, DOD will reimburse the contractor for some portion 
of the additional costs and the contractor may be incentivized 
to seek additional information for relatively minor changes in 
the final business mix. 
If either DOD or the contractor believes that the 
business mix is not representative of the DOD's share of the 
contamination, they might be willing to incur additional costs 
to use more detailed technical fingerprinting as the basis for 
a cost allocation. 
4.  Technical Fingerprinting 
Technical Fingerprinting is used to establish the exact 
relationship between the contamination and prior Government 
contracts. It may serve as the basis for a fair share 
allocation or used to justify a direct payment. Technical 
fingerprinting also requires the most precise information 
about when and how the contamination occurred. Consequently, 
the information costs incurred to implement this method are 
likely to be the highest. It stands to reason that the 
Government or contractor should not advocate this method 
unless they believe that the additional information costs 
incurred are offset by a reduced share of the remediation 
costs. 
On a spectrum of information needed, the No Allocation 
method and a normal business expense approach without third 
parties require the least information to implement. At the 
opposite end of the information spectrum,  a technical 
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fingerprint based allocation requires the most data. The other 
methods fall between the two extremes. 
5.  When to Incur Additional Information Costs 
When costs should be incurred to obtain additional 
information regarding the contamination and its relationship 
to DOD contracts is illustrated next. 
DOD's costs (Cd) include information costs incurred 
internal to DOD (Ig), 95% of the contractor's information 
costs (Ic) and 95% of the amount accumulated in the G&A cost 
pool. The 95% is based on DOD making up 95% of the 
contractor's current total cost input. The amount accumulated 
in the G&A cost pool is the otherwise allowable costs, (R), 
times a coefficient that represents the portion of the 
remediation costs that are allocable to DOD contracts. The 
coefficient will be referred to as the DOD fingerprint, (s). 
For a normal business expense approach, the DOD fingerprint is 
equal to one: all otherwise allowable costs are allocated 
because no connection between contract and contamination is 
required. For a business mix or technical fingerprint 
approach, it will equal the DOD fair share established by 
either the business mix or technical data. Consequently: 
Cd= Ig + .951c + .95(R*s) 
It can be shown that for DOD to breakeven on a decision 
to seek additional information to prove that DOD contracts 
were not associated with the contamination, the resultant 
decrease in DOD's fingerprint coefficient must be greater than 
the following amount: 
(Ig + .95IO/.95R 
This expression reflects what is intuitively obvious: as 
the information costs incurred go up in proportion to the 
otherwise allowable remediation costs, the DOD share must 
decrease more for DOD to breakeven. In the scenario, if each 
of DOD and the contractor incur $1 million in information 
costs, the DOD fingerprint must decrease 13.68% for DOD to 
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actually incur less costs overall as a result of its decision 
to seek additional information.6 
Similarly, the contractor's costs consist of 5% of the 
information costs plus 5% of the amount accumulated in the G&A 
pool. Additionally, that portion of remediation costs not 
reimbursed by DOD, (1-s) , must be borne out of pocket. 
Accordingly: 
Cc= .051c + .05(R*s) + (l-s)*R 
It can be shown that for the contractor to break even on 
a decision to seek additional information, the resultant 
increase in DOD's fingerprint coefficient must exceed the 
following amount: 
.05*Ic/.95*R 
This expression shows that it is to the contractor's 
advantage to incur additional information costs for very 
little expected increases in DOD's fingerprint. In the 
scenario, if each of DOD and the contractor incur $1 million 
in information costs, the DOD fair share must increase only 
.35% for the contractor to incur fewer costs overall as a 
result of his decision.7 
If neither the contractor nor DOD believe that incurring 
additional information costs will result in the fingerprint 
coefficient increasing or decreasing, the optimal course of 
6
 As the G&A rate decreases (i.e. current DOD business 
base decreases), the required reduction in the fingerprint 
coefficient becomes even larger. At a G&A rate o 5* and 
information costs of $1 million, s must decrease 260« for DOD 
to breakeven on a decision to seek additional information. 
7
 As the G&A rate decreases, the DOD fingerprint 




action is for neither party to incur additional information 
costs. 
To illustrate this result, Table 5 below shows the costs 
of the various strategies when neither the contractor nor DOD 
believe that the fingerprint coefficient is modifiable. The 
fingerprint coefficient is initially 50% and information costs 
are fixed at $1 million for both DOD and the contractor. 
Neither DOD nor the contractor can do any better by choosing 
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Table 5: Contractor and DOD Estimate No Change in 
Fingerprint Coefficient 
If the contractor, however, believes that the additional 
information will result in even a minor increase in the 
fingerprint coefficient, as low as .35% in the example, the 
contractor's dominant strategy is to incur costs for 
additional information. The additional information costs, for 
which the contractor ultimately pays only a fraction, are more 
than offset by the reduction in out of pocket expenses 
represented by DOD paying more of the allowable remediation 
costs. 
If the contractor incurs additional information costs, it 
is not to DOD's advantage to follow suit unless it believes 
that the contractor's gain can be limited sufficiently to 
offset the additional information costs. Since DOD must 
achieve a significantly higher reduction in the fingerprint 
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coefficient, it should not be as willing to incur the 
additional costs. Otherwise, DOD is merely paying for the 
contractor's and its own additional information costs. 
This result is shown in Table 6. Assume that the 
contractor, by incurring $1 million in additional information 
costs is able to increase the fingerprint coefficient by 10%. 
DOD, if it also incurs $1 million in information costs is able 
to restrict the increase to only 5% when the contractor is 



















$7. 875 million 
Table 6: Contractor Estimates an Increase in the 
Fingerprint Coefficient 
If the contractor incurs the $1 million in additional 
information costs and DOD follows suit, DOD's costs will be 
$275,000 more than if it had not sought additional 
information, $9.5 million vs. $9,875 million. DOD is actually 
better off in this scenario to do nothing. 
Note also that DOD's most favorable outcome, a $6.7 
million cost, is achieved when it seeks additional information 
and the contractor does not. Since this outcome is also the 
contractor's worst, the contractor will change strategies and 
incur additional information costs. In theocratic game terms, 
the solution to this game is actually in the lower left 
quadrant. 
Although the scenario and strategies are hypothetical, 
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they reveal that the contractor should be the more likely of 
the two parties to incur additional information costs if data 
can be found to justify an increase in DOD's portion. During 
negotiations, the data obtained by incurring the costs would 
be used to justify a higher DOD share. Conversely, DOD should 
be more willing to accept a wider range of DOD shares unless 
the contractor's position significantly differs from 
reasonable expectations. 
If the reduction in the fingerprint coefficient required 
to justify incurring additional information costs is so high, 
Contracting Officers' preferences for fair share based 
allocation methods, which generally require more detailed data 
is, at first glance, surprising. This point is addressed in 
more detail in a later section. 
B.  DOD BUSINESS BASE CHANGING 
In this section, the results of DOD business as a 
percentage of the contractor's total business base increasing, 
decreasing or remaining the same since the contamination 
occurred are discussed. 
1. No Allocation 
Changes in the business base will have little affect on 
the costs paid by the contractor and DOD if remediation costs 
are not allocated to DOD contracts. Similarly, DOD contract 
costs will not be affected by costs incurred today to clean up 
yesterday's contamination or by changes in the business mix. 
Such a non-allocation, if not generally accepted as fair, is 
certainly neutral and independent. 
2. Normal Business Expense Allocation 
Since no requirement exists for a connection between a 
DOD contract and the contamination, the proportion of costs 
paid by DOD will depend entirely on indirect rates and, in the 
case of G&A, on the current business mix. In the scenario, 
$14.25 million of the costs are paid by DOD because DOD makes 
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up 95% of the total cost input. If the current DOD percentage 
of total cost input was only 20%, $3 million would be paid by 
DOD. 
Such an allocation method could create strong incentives 
for a contractor seeking sources of financing for remediation 
efforts at a site previously used for commercial work. DOD 
work could be re-assigned to a business unit located at a 
commercial site that was being remediated. DOD contracts would 
then bear a portion of the remediation costs in proportion to 
their total cost input. As DOD contractors reorganize their 
businesses to remain competitive and adapt to defense 
downsizing, such re-locations are a distinct possibility. 
Contracting Officers have been advised by the Defense Contract 
Management Command (DCMC) to consider such possibilities so 
that DOD does not pay to remediate contamination that was 
entirely the result of a commercial operation [Ref. 27]. 
Stated from a slightly different vantage point, a payment for 
remediation costs is a correction for previous underpricing: 
if there is a mix of commercial and DOD work, DOD shouldn't 
necessarily pay  for  the  correction to  the underpriced 
commercial work [Ref. 35]. Such advice is contrary to a strict 
interpretation of the normal business expense guidance, which 
treats remediation costs as necessary for overall operation of 
the business unit. It is, however, tacit recognition that in 
the interest of fairness and equity, some connection between 
DOD contracts and the contamination, however remote, must 
exist for DOD to reimburse the contractor for remediation 
costs. 
3.  Business Mix Factored Allocation 
Under a business mix approach, the DOD share, determined 
by the prior DOD business base, would be allocated across 
current contracts in proportion to the current DOD business 
base. If DOD business was 20% when the contamination occurred 
and it is 95% today, $2.85 million of the $15 million in 
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remediation costs would be borne by DOD contracts. Conversely, 
if the prior DOD business mix was 95% and today it is 20%, 
$2.85 million would still be paid by DOD. When the DOD 
business base decreases, the effect of the factored allocation 
is to spread the DOD share across the contractor's non-DOD 
business base. The opposite would be true if the DOD business 
base had increased: more remediation costs would be borne by 
DOD contracts. 
4.  Technical Fingerprinting Factored Allocation 
The effects of a changing business base on a technical 
fingerprinting approach are similar to those of the business 
mix-based allocation. The DOD fair share, as determined by 
technical fingerprinting, is allocated across the contractor's 
current business base. Even if 9 0% of the contaminants were 
DOD related, if DOD makes up 20% of the current business 
today, only $2.7 million will be borne by DOD contracts. When 
the DOD business base decreases, the factored allocation 
dilutes DOD's costs. 
A possible consequence of such an allocation method is a 
reluctance for contractors to locate commercial business at 
sites previously dedicated to DOD contracts. As DOD 
contractors loose DOD business during the current downsizing, 
some are attempting to sell off older properties to reduce 
overhead costs. Many, however, cannot be sold until they are 
fully remediated. A number of these same DOD contractors are 
actively seeking commercial business. To minimize new start up 
costs and use idle facilities, the contractor might be tempted 
to locate the new commercial business at a site awaiting 
remediation. At least one major accounting firm is advising 
its customers against such a decision because it confuses the 
issue of responsibility for the contamination [Ref. 48] . Costs 
incurred to remediate the site would be allocated to any 
remaining DOD contracts and the contractor's new business. At 
its inception, the new business would be forced to bear 
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unwanted overhead. [Ref. 48] 
The incentives of a normal business approach and a fair 
share approach such as technical fingerprinting for a DOD 
contractor with commercial business can be diametrically 
opposed. A normal business expense approach creates incentives 
to co-locate commercial business at the site previously 
dedicated to DOD work; a fair share approach creates 
incentives to keep them apart. 
C  SPECIAL ALLOCATIONS 
The use of a factored allocation tends to distort any 
beneficial relationship inherent in a fair share approach when 
the current DOD business base has changed significantly or is 
not consistent with the technical fingerprint. One alternative 
is to use a special allocation under CAS 403, CAS 410, and CAS 
418. As was discussed in Chapter Two, a special allocation is 
permitted when the benefits accruing to the contract from the 
costs are significantly different than those accruing to other 
cost objectives. 
In the case of a special allocation, DOD's fair share of 
the remediation costs, as determined by a business mix or 
fingerprint approach, would be allocated only to DOD 
contracts. In cases where DOD contracts were significantly 
associated with the contamination, but the DOD business base 
has decreased, it is in the contractor's interest to seek a 
special allocation as opposed to a factored allocation. The 
converse is true when DOD contracts were not associated with 
the contamination, but the DOD business base has increased. 
One possible byproduct of a special allocation is the 
premium placed on information. For either the contractor or 
DOD to substantiate a special allocation, specific information 
about when and how the contamination occurred would be 
required. As was already pointed out, it is generally more 
advantageous for the contractor to seek such additional 
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information since a portion of his additional information 
costs will be borne by DOD. 
D.  OVERHEAD RATE EFFECTS 
If remediation costs are allocated, irrespective of the 
method, indirect costs borne by DOD will increase. Overhead or 
G&A rates will increase as remediation costs are accumulated 
in indirect cost pools and allocated across the appropriate 
base. As a result, remediation costs allocated to current DOD 
programs will increase independent of any decision made by the 
Program Manager. The magnitude of the costs borne by a program 
will be determined instead by the magnitude of the otherwise 
allowable remediation costs and the allocation method used. 
Decision makers in the executive and legislative branches 
use financial data about a program's cost to determine its 
viability. At each Milestone Review, the Milestone Decision 
Authority ensures that actual program costs are consistent 
with Program Baselines, which include cost objectives. A 
breech in a baseline, such as exceeding a cost goal, attracts 
significant scrutiny from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and the Congress [Ref. 49]. Yet, it is conceivable, 
that program costs increase solely because of the allocation 
of remediation costs, the result of prior years' contamination 
and a particular allocation method. Subsequent decisions 
regarding the program based on such allocated costs could be 
biased unless some means is determined to factor out the 
effects of the remediation costs. 
Allocation of cleanup costs for contractor facilities 
also results in near invisibility of the costs to decision 
makers and those exercising oversight. In the Fiscal Year 1996 
budget request, the Clinton Administration is asking for $5 
billion to fund cleanup at DOD facilities and to comply with 
environmental laws [Ref. 50] . The $5 billion was placed in the 
budget request in spite of Congressional opposition to funding 
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non-defense items from the DOD budget [Ref. 50]. Yet, 
remediation of contractor facilities is being financed through 
procurement accounts by means of overhead reimbursement. 
Consequently, more than the explicit appropriation is being 
spent in the DOD budget to remediate the environment. Since 
the exact amounts are included in the overhead and G&A rates 
of thousands of contractors, there is no way to determine 
actually how much. Donna M. Heivilin, the GAO's Director of 
Defense Management and NASA issues, when speaking to the House 
Committee on Government Operations about DOD reimbursement of 
contractor cleanup costs stated, "DOD doesn't routinely 
collect data and can't provide Congress an idea of its funding 
liability in this area." [Ref. 51] 
As was discussed in the section on input substitution in 
Chapter II, the use of indirect cost pools to allocate 
significant portions of overall contract costs and the cost 
sensitivity of many DOD contracts creates a number of perverse 
incentives for the contractor. Because indirect costs 
generally follow direct labor, DOD contracts tend to favor 
labor over capital investment. Again, because indirect costs 
generally follow direct labor, DOD contractors are 
incentivized when considering make-or-buy decisions to produce 
in-house. Allocation of additional remediation costs via 
overhead or G&A would tend to magnify such incentives. 
The inclusion of remediation costs in indirect cost rates 
has also had another unintended consequence: delaying final 
agreement on overhead rates for contract closeouts [Ref. 52] . 
Closeouts have assumed greater importance because if contracts 
are not closed out prior to the appropriation expiring, 
current year funds must be used to make any final payments. 
Final overhead rates cannot be negotiated until all associated 
issues, including responsibility of third party contaminators 
and insurance recovery, have been resolved. Such delays 
highlight a lack of consensus among Contracting Officers, 
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auditors and contractors about how to treat remediation costs. 
The Director of Operations at one Defense Contract Management 
Area Operations Office stated that he believed a lack of 
training in environmental cost issues contributed to the 
problems in negotiating overhead rates [Ref. 52] . The results 
of the informal survey where nearly 80% agreed that a Cost 
Principle is needed are consistent with this statement. 
E.  DOMINANT CONTRACTOR ALLOCATION METHODS 
This section determines if there is an allocation 
approach that is optimal for the contractor to follow under 
varying conditions: DOD business base, current and present, 
and DOD technical fingerprint. The informal survey scenario is 
revisited to illustrate the analysis. 
The costs borne by DOD for a number of different 
scenarios are tabulated in Table 7. "Prior DOD Base" refers to 
the DOD business base when the contamination occurred. "Tech 
FP" indicates the percentage of the remediation costs incurred 
to cleanup contamination associated with DOD contracts. "Tech. 
FP, Sp. All." refers to a special allocation to DOD contracts 
based on technical fingerprinting and "Tech. FP, Fac. All." to 
a factored allocation based on technical fingerprinting. "Bus. 
Mix, Sp. All." and "Bus. Mix, Fac. All." refer to a business 
mix based allocation for both a special and factored 
allocation. "Normal Bus. Mix" indicates an allocation based on 
a normal business expense approach. The dollar values in 
thetable are the remediation costs borne by DOD; contractor 
costs would be $15 million less the DOD share. The costs are 
in millions of dollars. 
Based on the scenario, the various allocation methods, 
different conditions, and the assumption that the contractor 
wishes to maximize the DOD share of the costs, a number of 
points become evident. First, the contractor's preferred 
allocation method under conditions of extreme optimism, a 
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maxi-max criteria, is Normal Business Expense for an 
increasing DOD base. For a constant DOD base, a Normal 
Business Expense and a Business Mix Special Allocation result 
in the same cost sharing. Given then that the contractor 
believes that the DOD contracts will increase or remain 
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$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Tech. FP, 
Sp.AU. 
$13.50 $4.50 $13.50 $4.50 $13.50 $4.50 
Tech. FP, 
Fac. All. 
$12.83 $4.28 $10.80 $3.60 $2.70 $.90 
Bus. Mix, 
Sp. All. 
$3.00 $3.00 $12.00 $12.00 $14.25 $14.25 
Bus.Mix, 
Fac. AU. 
$2.85 $2.85 $9.60 $9.60 $2.85 $2.85 
Normal 
Bus Exp. 
$14.25 $14.25 $12.00 $12.00 $12.00 $12.00 
]' 
Table 7: DOD Costs Using the Various Allocation 
Methods 
If the contractor believes that the DOD base will 
decrease, a Business Mix Special Allocation results in the 
lowest cost share. If only factored allocations are 
considered, the Normal Business Expense method is again the 
contractor's preferred choice. 
The Normal Business Expense approach is optimal for the 
contractor when the DOD base remains constant or is 
increasing.  If  the  contractor consistently claims  that 
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remediation costs are a normal and ordinary business expense, 
thereby invoking a Normal Business Expense approach, he should 
not dilute the DOD business base at a business unit with 
commercial contracts. Conversely, it is to the contractor's 
advantage to re-locate additional DOD businesses to a business 
unit if a Normal Business Expense approach is used. 
F.  COST ALLOCATION CRITERIA 
In Chapter II, a number of criteria were discussed that 
should be considered when selecting a cost allocation method. 
The criteria included benefit, cause, ability to bear, 
neutrality, independence and fairness. In this section, the 
various allocation methods are evaluated for consistency with 
the criteria. 
1.  Benefit 
There is no direct benefit between current contracts and 
costs incurred to remediate contamination caused by 
yesterday's contracts. Today's contracts benefit only 
indirectly, in the sense that the costs must be incurred for 
the contractor to remain in business. If the costs are not 
incurred, the contracts could probably not be performed: non- 
compliance with environmental laws could spell the end of the 
contractor's corporate existence. 
Defense contractors argue that remediation costs should 
be allocated to DOD contracts, along with any commercial ones, 
since they represent ordinary costs of doing business [Refs. 
53, 54 and 55] . DOD contracts benefit in the same way that 
they benefit from corporate taxes or other indirect expenses 
incurred for the business as a whole. Corporate taxes, 
although not directly beneficial to DOD contracts, have been 
determined to be an ordinary cost of doing business, allocable 
to DOD contracts [Ref. 56]. 
A Normal Business Expense approach most completely 
reflects  this perspective of an indirectly benefitting 
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relationship between current cost objectives and remediation 
costs. 
Yet, corporate taxes and other indirect expenses will be 
paid indefinitely: there is little expectation that they will 
be eliminated in the foreseeable future. Remediation costs, 
however, are not expected to continue indefinitely. DOD, for 
example, expects much of the remediation at its sites to be 
accomplished in the next twenty years [Ref. 45]. Remediation 
of  current  sites,  as  opposed to  compliance  to  future 
environmental  regulations,  will  eventually be  completed 
provided that no future contamination is generated. 
Additionally, unlike corporate taxes or top level managerial 
salaries, not all firms incur environmental remediation costs. 
Consequently, it is arguable that remediation costs represent 
other  than  an  ordinary  or  normal  expense.  Rather, 
environmental  remediation  costs  are  an  extraordinary 
adjustment to current income for underpricing yesterday's 
contracts. 
Today's contracts benefit indirectly from remediation 
costs only in the sense that they are necessary for overall 
operation of the business. Nevertheless, if the costs are not 
expected to be incurred indefinitely and represent an 
adjustment for past underpricing decisions, the argument that 
cleanup costs should be allocated as an ordinary recurring 
business expense looses much validity. 
2„  Cause 
The causal link may be viewed from two perspectives. 
First, the contracts being performed today did not cause the 
contamination being remediated. A No Allocation approach 
captures this sense of a causal relationship best. 
Second, the contamination was caused by the performance 
of DOD contracts. DOD should, consequently, pay a fair share 
today because its contracts caused the contamination. The 
various fair share approaches capture this sense of a causal 
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relationship best.  Technical fingerprinting or use of a 
Business Mix are efforts to tie DOD to the contamination. Yet, 
they also confuse the agency (DOD) with the cost objectives 
(the current DOD contract). 
Costs are allocated to a cost objective, to a contract, 
not to a Government agency. For cause to stand as an 
allocation criterion, the cost objective must have created the 
contamination. Not being the case, cause as a criterion for 
selecting a cost allocation method is weak at best. Strictly 
interpreted, none of the allocation methods, except No 
Allocation, can be based on a causal relationship. 
3. Ability to Bear 
The factored allocations, including a Normal Business 
Expense approach, most closely reflect an ability to bear 
criterion. Once a decision is made that remediation costs 
either represent a normal and ordinary expense of doing 
business or some portion represent DOD's fair share, they are 
allocated across a basis that represents the total activity of 
the firm. 
Given that only a tenuous beneficial link and no causal 
link exist between current contracts and remediation costs, 
ability to bear is the criterion that actually provides the 
best rationale for current allocation methods. 
4. Neutrality and Independence 
None of the allocation methods is neutral in the sense 
that their effects on decision-making are neutral. Costs 
incurred to cleanup prior contamination are allocated to 
current contracts and become part of the total contract or 
program costs. The total costs of two similar programs being 
allocated cleanup costs by two dissimilar methods may be quite 
different  and  result  in differing decisions  when not 
warranted. 
Nor are the allocation methods independent. Decisions to 
re-locate DOD contracts at a previously all-commercial 
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business unit or efforts to start up a commercial enterprise 
at a previously all-DOD site highlight the lack of 
independence. The portion of the cleanup costs allocated to 
DOD contracts will depend in part upon actions taken with 
regard to other cost objectives. 
5.  Fairness 
In Chapter II, a number of quantitative fairness criteria 
were discussed. Comparison of the allocation methods to the 
criterion is inconclusive, yet highlights the complexity of 
the issues. 
In accordance with the Impersonality Criterion, the 
fairest method is that which results in the lowest cost to 
both DOD and the contractor. In accordance with the Grading 
Criterion, every cost objective prefers its allocation under 
one method over all the others. If the scenario is viewed as 
a zero sum game in which those costs not borne by DOD must be 
borne by the contractor, it appears as if there is no method 
that can satisfy either criterion. If, however, information 
costs and subjective probabilities of DOD's participation in 
the contracts causing the contamination are factored into the 
scenario, it is possible that one allocation method may 
satisfy these criteria. This occurs because DOD bears a 
portion of the costs incurred to seek additional information. 
Consequently, if records regrading the actual DOD fingerprint 
are difficult and expensive to obtain, the lowest expected 
cost or the most preferable method for both the contractor and 
DOD may result from a Normal Business Expense approach. 
Application of the Mini-Max Criterion, to the scenarios 
in Table 7 results in selection of a Business Mix, Factored 
Allocation, approach. Using this method, the maximum that can 
be allocated to DOD is $9.60 million; the maximum to the 
contractor $12.15 million. These are the lowest maximums that 
could be allocated and would be considered the most fair by 
this criterion. 
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In another sense, the accounting methods must be uniform, 
consistent and verifiable to be considered fair. Uniform, 
consistent and verifiable application of an accounting method 
depends, in turn, on clearly stated accounting procedures 
based on a consensus among auditors, contractors and 
Contracting Officers about how remediation costs should be 
treated. 
In spite of the current DCMC and DCAA audit guidance, 
such a consensus is apparently lacking. A number of GAO 
reports, already discussed, have raised the issue of 
uniformity and consistency [Refs. 6 and 44]. The results of 
the informal survey also indicate a lack of consensus on how 
cleanup costs should be treated. The DCMC/DCAA guidance is 
based on the assumption that cleanup costs are a normal 
business expense; Contracting Officers are attempting to 
establish a DOD fair share. 
Lack of specific information about the contamination 
hinders uniform application of the various accounting methods. 
The more information required to implement a method, the more 
difficult the task. For example, attempting to fairly 
implement a Technical Fingerprint approach without specific 
information about the contaminants and associated contracts 
would be a daunting task. Conversely, application of a Normal 
Business Expense approach not involving third party 
contaminations would be relatively easy to implement uniformly 
and consistently; not as much information is required and much 
of what is needed is already available in the contractor's 
cost accounting system. 
Fairness of an accounting method, in the sense of 
uniformity, consistency and verifiability, depends then not 
only on the degree of consensus about how cleanup costs should 
be treated, but also on the available information. In this 
sense, a Normal Business Expense approach is probably more 
fair than the other methods since it can be applied to more 
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circumstances where information is limited. 
G.  APPLICATION OF CURRENT REMEDIATION COST GUIDANCE 
Current cost allocation guidance is based on the 
assumption that cleanup costs are a normal business expense. 
Contractor advocacy of the position that the guidance makes it 
unnecessary to establish a connection between contamination 
and prior DOD contracts has been previously discussed. This 
advocacy is consistent with the analysis that indicates that 
the Normal Business Expense approach is the contractor's 
optimal method among all the factored allocations. 
The preceding analysis has shown that for DOD to 
breakeven on a decision to incur additional costs to seek 
specific information about the contamination as a requisite 
for application of a fair share approach, the DOD share must 
be substantially reduced. It is most likely that a Normal 
Business Expense approach can be implemented more fairly in 
more circumstances. Yet, the informal survey and discussions 
with Contracting Officers indicate a preference for a fair 
share. 
One view on this dichotomy from industry is that 
Contracting Officers are "...hung up on the idea of a causal 
and beneficial relationship which is not meaningful in the 
context of remediation costs. Costs are required by law, legal 
obligations, a business expense that can't be evaded." [Ref. 
54] 
A Contracting Officer negotiating overhead rates which 
include costs already incurred to remediate contamination that 
occurred years ago is essentially in a sole source negotiation 
with the contractor. There is little direct competitive 
pressure on the contractor to minimize remediation costs. 
Since the costs have already been incurred, the Contracting 
Officer can only use the criterion of reasonableness to limit 
them. 
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When queried about the difference between the guidance 
and practice, one Contracting Officer stated that it 
represents a difference in the initial negotiating positions 
between the contractor and Contracting Officer [Ref. 27] . This 
view is based on the assumption that the audit guidance is 
just that: guidance. It is still incumbent upon the 
Contracting Officer to strike a fair and equitable agreement 
with the contractor that is consistent with Federal law and 
regulations. A member of the Cost Accounting Standards Board 
stated, "The ACO's effort to apportion costs on the basis of 
a connection reflects their belief that the cost paid by the 
Government should reflect the proportionate harm caused by the 
Government work." [Ref. 35] 
It is likely that if the guidance were modified to 
explicitly state that no nexus was required between past 
contamination and DOD contracts for remediation costs to be 
considered a normal business expense, fully allocable to 
current contracts per a total cost input base, the dichotomy 
probably would disappear. The price tag of such guidance for 
DOD could, however, be astronomical. 
Conversely, guidance explicitly stating that such a 
connection was necessary, as in the proposed Cost Principle, 
would result in additional information costs that would be 
borne by DOD programs as contractors and DOD alike expended 
resources to establish the exact degree of DOD participation 
in the contamination. 
In the final chapter, conclusions and recommendations are 
presented. In particular, the issues of which allocation 
method, if any, is the most fair and the need for a an 
environmental Cost Principle are addressed. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this thesis was to examine various 
methods of allocating environmental remediation costs incurred 
to cleanup contractor facilities to DOD contracts. To achieve 
this objective, the researcher reviewed Government accounting 
practices, current DOD guidance regarding the allocation of 
cleanup costs, interviewed a number of personnel tasked with 
developing or implementing such guidance, and conducted an 
informal survey of DCMC contracting personnel. The researcher 
discussed and analyzed the various cost allocation methods in 
an effort to determine which method, given the controversy of 
cleanup costs, was the most fair and the most equitable. As a 
result, the researcher concludes that none of the methods is 
consistently fair or equitable and that remediation costs 
should not be allocated to DOD contracts as indirect contract 
costs. 
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
1. Environmental remediation costs should not be 
allocated to DOD contracts. Reimbursement of the contractor 
for any share of the costs for which DOD is responsible should 
be made  independently of  the  contract  cost  accounting 
system. 
There is no direct beneficial or causal relationship 
between remediation costs and current contracts. There is an 
indirect relationship in the sense that the costs are 
necessary for the overall operation of the business. Given the 
tenuous relationship between costs and contract, cleanup costs 
are actually allocated on an ability to bear basis. 
The costs are not normal and recurring in the sense that 
they are expected to reoccur indefinitely in the future. 
Cleanup will ultimately be completed. Additionally, not all 
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DOD contractors incur remediation costs. Rather, the costs are 
more appropriately viewed as an extraordinary adjustment to 
past underpricing. 
The allocation of remediation costs via indirect cost 
pools are not neutral nor independent. Allocated cleanup costs 
can adversely affect decision-making about the affected 
programs. Allocating remediation costs to DOD contracts and 
reimbursing contractors from procurement accounts conceals the 
true amount of the remediation costs being paid from the DOD 
budget. The addition of remediation costs to indirect cost 
pools amplifies input substitution effects. 
Given the lack of relationship between cleanup costs and 
current contracts, the ultimately non-recurring nature of 
remediation costs, and the overhead effects on DOD budgeting 
and program decision-making, cleanup costs should not be 
allocated to DOD contracts. This does not mean that 
contractors should not be reimbursed by DOD for a portion of 
the costs. Rather, cost recovery should come from another 
source. 
2, A clear statement of the basis upon which DOD's 
share of remediation costs will be determined is required. 
From an accounting perspective, there is no consistently 
fair and equitable method for allocating remediation costs to 
DOD contracts. From a policy perspective, however, there may 
be reasons for DOD to bear a share of the cleanup costs. If, 
in the interests of national security, preservation of the 
defense industrial base, environmental safety, or some other 
clearly articulated policy, the administration and the 
Congress determine that DOD should bear some of the costs, the 
basis for establishing DOD's share should be clearly 
established. This clarification would eliminate inconsistent 
application and reduce the attendant uncertainty. 
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C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. DOD's share of cleanup costs at a site should be 
based on DOD's participation in the contaminating activity. A 
connection should exist between prior DOD contracts and the 
contamination. 
Once removed from a cost allocation scenario, it becomes 
more difficult to justify reimbursing the contractor's 
remediation costs merely on the basis of DOD's current share 
of the contractor's business base. Just because DOD contracts 
can bear the costs, doesn't mean that they should. As 
Congressman Mike Synar (D-OK) proclaimed, "The Federal 
government shouldn't pay cleanup costs just because we paid 
them to build a plane." [Ref. 57] 
If the administration and the Congress decide that DOD 
should reimburse contractors for a portion of contractor 
cleanup costs, a connection between prior DOD contracts and 
the contamination being remediated should exist before DOD 
pays. The amount of DOD's share should depend solely upon the 
degree of DOD participation in the contracts that caused the 
contamination. 
The burden of proving such a connection and the degree of 
participation should lie with the contractor. Merely being the 
customer of a firm should not be sufficient to establish DOD 
participation. Rather, the contractor should be required to 
prove that DOD requirements contributed to the contamination: 
for example, a DOD specification required the use of a 
chemical later determined to be a contaminant. If the use of 
the contaminant was not DOD directed, DOD participation should 
not be construed. Costs incurred to remediate contamination of 
third party contaminators should also meet this same test to 
prevent DOD from being used as a deep pocket to remediate the 
environment. 
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2. Reimburse contractors independently of the contract 
cost accounting system for DOD's share of the contamination at 
a site. 
To eliminate the adverse effects of allocating 
remediation costs to DOD contracts, allowable cleanup costs 
should be funded from other than procurement accounts. One 
must recognize that if the contractor was engaged entirely in 
a commercial market, cleanup cost recovery would be required 
for the company to remain viable in the long run. In the 
commercial market, his pricing decisions are exposed to 
varying degrees of competitive pressure. In a DOD market, 
particularly if the costs have already been incurred, many of 
the market's competitive pressures are absent. The regulatory 
scheme implemented among DOD contractors to simulate the 
operation of competition in a commercial industry must not 
only ensure that DOD pays to the extent it participated, but 
must also ensure that a fair and reasonable price is paid for 
the remediation efforts. 
The Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) 
should be expanded for the duration of the remediation effort 
to include cleanup of contractor owned and operated 
facilities. Following a DERP estimate of the extent of the 
remediation required at the contractor facility, the 
contractor and DOD should negotiate the DOD share. Upon 
reaching agreement on the appropriate shares, the contractor 
and DOD should jointly solicit and award remediation contracts 
on a competitive basis and monitor actual cleanup. The funding 
for DOD's share of the remediation should be provided from the 
Defense Environmental Restoration Account (DERA). 
If cleanup costs have already been incurred, DOD's share 
should be negotiated and DERA funds used to reimburse the 
contractor. 
Information costs of geologists, researchers, 
environmental engineers, attorneys or scientists associated 
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with establishing the degree of DOD participation should be 
allowable only if DOD participation in the manner described is 
proved. Otherwise, the contractor should bear any additional 
information costs incurred. 
3. The contractor should be incentivized to seek 
recovery from insurance companies and third party 
contaminators. 
As part of the DERP cleanup process, advance agreements 
should be used to ensure that DOD and the DERA are reimbursed 
whenever the contractor is able to collect from a third party 
contaminator or an insurance company. Incentives should be 
built into the advance agreements and based on the share paid 
by DOD. For example, if DOD and the contractor agreed that the 
DOD share of a $15 million remediation effort was 50% and DERA 
funded $7.5 million of the cleanup, an agreement could make 
provisions for the contractor to retain 75% of any recoveries. 
D.  ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The answers to the research questions outlined in Chapter 
I follow: 
1.  Primary Question 
What are feasible methods for allocating environmental 
remediation costs to Department of Defense contracts in a fair 
and equitable manner? 
Essentially, remediation costs may be allocated on a 
Normal Business Expense or Fair Share basis. As a Normal 
Business Expense, otherwise allowable cleanup costs are 
allocated in their entirety to current contractor business, 
including DOD contracts. Thus, the portion of the costs borne 
by DOD is determined by how much of the contractor's current 
business is made up of DOD contracts. 
The Fair Share approach is based on determination of a 
DOD share of the cleanup costs. The DOD share, in turn, may be 
established by technical fingerprinting or by an approximation 
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based on the DOD business base at the time the contamination 
occurred. 
None of the methods, however, are consistently fair and 
equitable due to the unavailability of perfect information and 
the lack of clear causal or beneficial relationships to 
current contracts. Additionally, none of the allocation 
methods is neutral, independent or free of adverse, unintended 
consequences. 
2.  Subsidiary Questions 
What is the current guidance for the allocation of 
environmental remediation costs? 
DCMC and DCAA issued joint guidance in 1992, supplemented 
in 1994, which states that remediation costs should be treated 
as normal business expenses and generally allocated as 
indirect costs via the G&A pool across a total input base. 
This guidance will be augmented by the results of DCMC's Pilot 
Program, which is nearing conclusion. 
Two major points of controversy result from the guidance. 
First, costs incurred to cleanup contamination caused by third 
party contaminators are not allowable under DOD contracts. The 
contractor is required to pursue recovery of such costs 
through CERCLA mechanisms and any uncollectible amounts are 
considered to be similar to bad debts and thus unallowable. 
Contractors argue that costs incurred to cleanup sites, an 
action often mandated by law or regulation, are ordinary 
business expenses no matter the source of the contamination 
that should be fully allocated and recovered. The opposing 
viewpoint is that taxpayers should not be required to pay the 
bill for contamination that was not caused by DOD actions. 
Recovery from insurance coverages creates the second 
major controversy in the guidance. Contractors argue that 
because environmental damage was not a specifically insured 
risk in older General Comprehensive Liability policies, 
recoveries from insurance companies occur only after prolonged 
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negotiations and litigation. Since the likelihood of immediate 
recovery is slim, they argue that potentially covered costs 
should be allocable to DOD contracts. DOD would be credited 
for any future recoveries. The opposing argument is that DOD 
should not pay contractors if there is a possibility of 
recovery. In particular, the contractor would not be 
incentivized to aggressively seek recovery if DOD had already 
reimbursed him for incurred cleanup costs. 
There is no Environmental Cost Principle. 
What other methods were considered while the current 
guidance was being developed? 
Prior to release of the joint DCMC and DCAA guidance, 
draft provisions of an Environmental Cost Principle included 
provisions which required that performance of DOD contracts 
must have caused at least some of the contamination before the 
costs could be considered allowable and allocable to current 
DOD contracts. The current guidance, however, does not specify 
such a relationship. 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of each 
allocation method? 
The primary advantage of a Normal Business Expense 
approach is that it requires less information about the 
sources and timing of the contamination. It is, consequently, 
less costly to implement. The Normal Business expense 
approach, however, does not require DOD participation in the 
contaminating events and is based on an ability to bear 
criterion. DOD's share of cleanup costs is determined solely 
by DOD's percentage of the contractor's current business base. 
The various Fair Share approaches are difficult to 
implement because they require detailed technical information 
that is often lacking. To obtain the information, additional 
costs must be incurred that are ultimately borne by DOD 
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contracts. 
None of the allocation methods is neutral or independent. 
Given the same contamination scenario, the choice of a method 
affects the total cost of a contract. Programs and contracts 
appear more costly than they would otherwise because of how 
the costs are allocated; this could result in poor decisions 
by Program Offices and those exercising oversight. 
Additionally, allocation of remediation costs to indirect cost 
pools amplifies tendencies to substitute labor for capital 
investment and in-house production for subcontracting on DOD 
contracts. 
What allocation methods are actually being used by 
defense contractors and allowed by Contracting Officers? 
Contracting Officers appear to favor some variation of a 
Fair Share method where the fair share is established by a 
combination of technical fingerprinting, business mix and 
negotiations. This is contrary to a strict reading of the 
current DCMC and DCAA guidance which treats otherwise 
allowable remediation costs as a normal cost of doing business 
and allocable across a total cost input base. It is, however, 
consistent with the idea that Contracting Officers, although 
guided by the guidance, must exercise their judgment to 
determine a fair and reasonable price by means of negotiations 
with the contractor. 
Is additional guidance regarding the allocation of 
environmental  remediation costs required by Contracting 
Officers? 
Based on the informal survey results, conversations with 
contracting personnel and the dichotomy that exists between 
current guidance and practice, additional guidance is 
required. To resolve many of the issues associated with 
environmental  remediation  costs,  an  environmental  Cost 
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Principle should be developed. To implement the 
recommendations of this thesis such a Cost Principle would 
merely state that environmental remediation costs are not 
allocable to DOD contracts and that any DOD payments for 
cleanup  costs  would  be  made  through  DERP. 
E.  AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During the course of this thesis, other areas that 
appeared to merit additional study were identified. Addressing 
these areas was beyond the scope of this thesis and they are 
presented for consideration for future research. 
Specific recommendations to apply the Defense 
Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) to contractor owned 
and operated facilities. 
To adapt the DERP to fund a share of the remediation 
costs at contractor owned and operated facilities, a number of 
organizational functions and responsibilities would have to be 
modified. For example, would DCMC or DOD's current agent for 
DERP, the Army Corps of Engineers, be tasked with negotiating 
DOD shares and administering site remediation contracts. A 
detailed examination of current functions and possible 
modifications could provide such a plan of action. 
Analysis of the results of DCMC's Environmental 
Initiatives Task Force Cost Allowance Program (Pilot Program). 
Once DCMC's Pilot Program results are released, the new 
guidance should be analyzed to determine possible effects on 
environmental cost allowability and allocability. 
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